American University in Cairo

AUC Knowledge Fountain
Theses and Dissertations

Student Research

Summer 7-15-2022

Assessing New Wars Theory in The Post-Arab Spring Era: The
Libyan and Yemeni Wars (2011-2020)
Shady El-Sherif
shadysaleh@aucegypt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Near and Middle Eastern Studies Commons

Recommended Citation

APA Citation
El-Sherif, S. (2022).Assessing New Wars Theory in The Post-Arab Spring Era: The Libyan and Yemeni Wars
(2011-2020) [Master's Thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain.
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1937

MLA Citation
El-Sherif, Shady. Assessing New Wars Theory in The Post-Arab Spring Era: The Libyan and Yemeni Wars
(2011-2020). 2022. American University in Cairo, Master's Thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain.
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1937

This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at AUC Knowledge
Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC
Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact thesisadmin@aucegypt.edu.

ASSESSING NEW WARS THEORY IN
THE POST-ARAB SPRING ERA:
THE LIBYAN AND YEMENI WARS
(2011-2020)
A Thesis Submitted by

Shady Saleh El-Sherif
to the

Comparative Middle East Politics and Society (CMEPS)
Graduate Program

June 5, 2022

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Comparative Middle East Politics and Society

0|Page

ASSESSING NEW WARS THEORY IN THE
POST-ARAB SPRING ERA:
THE LIBYAN AND YEMENI WARS
(2011-2020)
A Thesis Submitted by

Shady Saleh El-Sherif
to the

Comparative Middle East Politics and Society (CMEPS)
Graduate Program
Has been approved by
Bahgat Korany (Supervisor)
Professor
Political Science Department
The American University in Cairo

____________________

Sean Lee (First Reader/Internal Examiner)
Assistant Professor
Political Science Department
The American University in Cairo

____________________

Mirjam Edel (Second Reader/External Examiner)
Associate Professor
Institute of Political Science
Universität Tübingen

____________________

Graduate Program Director

Date

School Dean

Date

____________________

________

____________________

________

1|Page

AKNOWLEDGMENTS

I dedicate this thesis to my father, Dr. Saleh El-Sherif, who never had a rest to
provide everything for me and our family, without his kindness and restless
support, I wouldn’t reach any success in my life. To my mother who was always
preparing everything to allow me and my brother and sisters to pursue our dreams
and climb the ladder of success. To my professor, Dr. Bahgat Korany, who was
by my side from the first step until the end and didn’t hesitate to give his full
support even during his very times. To my brother and sisters who stood by me
and helped me to stand up when I was down.

2|Page

The American University in Cairo
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Political Science Department

ASSESSING NEW WARS THEORY IN THE POST-ARAB SPRING
ERA: THE LIBYAN AND YEMENI WARS (2011-2020)
Shady Saleh El-Sherif
Supervised by Professor Bahgat Korany

ABSTRACT
Mary Kaldor’s “New Wars” theory which was first published in 1991 argues that warfare has
changed after the Cold War with the growing globalization and the rise of violent non-state
actors. According to the theory, globalization augmented certain problems that are considered
the main causes of these “new wars” such as; state fragility/failure, identity politics, and war
economy methods which all account at present for the continuation of conflicts, especially in
the MENA region with more civilian casualties. To assess this theory, I am using a
comparative case study methodology with a historical process-tracing approach for the
Yemeni and Libyan wars from 2011 until 2020. This comparative analysis seeks to either
validate the relevance of the theory in the post-Arab Spring era or refuse Kaldor’s argument
that modes of warfare have changed. The reason for choosing both cases is that conflicts in
both states are being directed mostly by non-state actors rather than sovereign states, and they
became more brutal against civilians and much longer. Hence, after the assessment, we should
see if the conventional understanding of war and peacebuilding that prevailed in the pre-Cold
War era should be reconsidered to enable efficient and decisive policies to control and hopefully- stop these "new wars" or not.

Keywords: New wars, State Fragility, Failed States, Identity Politics, Tribalism,
International Intervention, War Economy, Intrastate Wars
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RESEARCH STRUCTURE

I am starting in Chapter I with the research foundations where I am stating my research
problem which is to what extent Kaldor’s theory is applicable and useful to
explain/understand the wars in Yemen and Libya between 2011 and 2020? Then, I am
explaining the significance of this thesis as it ignites the spark for researchers to dig deeper
into Mary Kaldor’s theory of New Wars and apply its hypothesis to real cases.
Afterward, I am showing my methodology in tackling my research problem which is
mainly the positivist historical process-tracing approach with the comparative case study
methodology by choosing Libya and Yemen as my case studies from 2011 till 2020, which
would help me to understand the developments through which warfare went from the pre-Cold
War era up till today. At the end of this chapter, I am shedding the light on the limitations that
affected my research work and how future research should tackle this theory in a more
comprehensive and inclusive way.
In Chapter II, I am delving deeper into the theory of new wars and the academic history
of the thesis on the changing warfare after the Cold War, then the features of the new wars
theory and I am ending this chapter by showing the academic critique that was directed toward
Kaldor’s theory and how she defended her new framework. Then in Chapter III and IV are
mainly devoted to analyzing the cases of Libya and Yemen from 2011 when popular protests
took the streets against the rule of the longest-serving leader in the Arab world, Muammar AlQadafi, then I am ending my focus timeline with 2020 because of the lack of recent
comprehensive related studies.
I am applying Kaldor’s features of new wars in both cases to see how the theory of New
Wars would ever lead to a different understanding and analysis of the conflicts in these
countries or it would add no value to the ongoing literature and policies concerned with these
cases. So, I am starting both chapters by showing the historical development of both cases and
how we have reached the recent situation in Libya and Yemen, then I am taking each feature
of new wars and apply it on each country. Therefore, I am testing whether such conflicts can
be described as New Wars in Kaldor’s terms or not.
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INTRODUCTION
The history of humanity is full of conflicts. People were fighting each other either over
scarce resources or over a certain territory. It has never been a question of whether it is right or
wrong to start a conflict, but it was always a question of a victory or a defeat, so the victorious
side of the conflict takes all from the defeated side. Moreover, wars have always been a human
tragedy which George Nicholson described it by saying that “War does not decide the justice
of any question. It only determines which party is the most ferocious and savage. Virtuous but
weak nations, have been reduced to the greatest subjection, without even a charge of offense
or injury” (Nicholson, 1819: 54).
There has been a global commitment to “never again” among world nations after the
Second World War in 1945. However, until 2021, we can say that we didn’t have a Third World
War, but we are still having wars among nations, as each nation or actor fighting for its own
agenda with no major ideological objectives fueling these conflicts as it was in the two World
Wars. Moreover, we are witnessing wars within states, as we might see a conflict between a
national government and a certain rogue armed group on its territory, but they both are fighting
other groups or militias over a different set of objectives.
It is clear now that the world has changed since World War II, but the real change in the
nature of wars and conflicts can be traced back to the era that followed the Cold War. There
were new challenges posed by the vacuum of power that resulted after the fall of the Soviet
Union in 1991. Also, globalization has a great impact on amplifying these emergent challenges,
because the global openness that globalization has brought to the world made conflicts today
become more vicious, longer, and with no clear winners in any of them.
The change in warfare in the post-Cold War era is not merely in weapons or in war tactics,
but it is even in the nature of that warfare the world used to know among nation-states, which
was first described and detailed by the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz in his remarkable
book “On War” in 1832.
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Additionally, globalization has been testing the power and cohesion of the states and their
ability to adapt to their new challenges. Hence, many states couldn’t hold on and were
fragmented, which led to the creation of “failed states”. Today, we can find most of these failed
states in Africa and the Middle East according to certain criteria that will be mentioned later in
Chapter II. With that in mind, there is a growing sense of global insecurity that is obviously
caused by the fundamental changes that happened in the modes of warfare, managing
economies, and protecting civilians.
It is important to know that globalization also created “Asymmetrical” warfare that
paramilitary groups and militias are utilizing to claim political power in states that lost their
full control over their own territories. Asymmetrical warfare according to Patrick Mello is “a
mode of combat where the aims, means, or methods of the conflict parties are substantively
dissimilar” (Mello, 2014: 1).
On the other hand, Congressman Ike Skelton believes that “Asymmetrical” warfare refers
to a conflict where “one force deploying new capabilities that the opposing force does not
perceive or understand, conventional capabilities that counter or overmatch the capabilities of
its opponent, or capabilities that represent totally new methods of attack or defense or a
combination of these attributes” (Skelton, 2001: 23).
Building on what was mentioned previously, Mary Kaldor’s New Wars theory suggests
that some factors of the globalization era such as technological advancements, state
fragility/failure, identity politics, and war economy incentives account at present for the
continuation of conflicts with more civilian casualties. Moreover, these characteristics are
gradually changing the concept of “war battles”, as they turn physical confrontations into less
physical, but more fatal and indecisive fights for any side.
It has been three decades since the debate on Kaldor’s New Wars theory started. We are
now in 2022 witnessing new developments in conflicts across the globe, these new
developments should add new inputs to that debate, in order to make it cope with modern
warfare and with the contemporary global context.
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Therefore, the base for this paper’s argument is the argument about which Kaldor has
initiated the debate, which rests on the point that contemporary warfare is mainly characterized
by the spread of weak and failed states, as they were mainly an outcome of both identity
cleavages and the negative effects of globalization and technological advancements. The
technological advancements facilitated many services such as communications, money
transfers, and acquiring the latest information about anything in a matter of seconds.
The situation in the Middle East after the Arab Spring uprisings that started in 2010 took
a very dramatic shift, as there were four sequential major regime changes since then in Tunisia,
Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, while what started in Syria during that wave turned into an ongoing
massive crisis. Furthermore, in 2014, when ISIS started to challenge strong governments in the
region and started to achieve remarkable success against the Iraqi government, it became clear
that the ongoing conflicts in that region have some similar features that are more or less
confirming most of Kaldor’s New Wars’ theory.
This thesis is mainly devoted to testing Kaldor’s assumptions on real-world cases (Libya
and Yemen) to see how can contemporary modes of warfare be understood within the
theoretical framework of the New Wars thesis. Thus, to start my thesis, I am dividing the thesis
foundations part as follows; the coming part is to explain the main problem, major questions,
and hypothesis of the research. Then I am stating the main objective and significance of my
paper. The third part is for stating my methodology in answering my research questions. Then,
the fourth part is for clarifying my research limitations that should be taken into consideration
for further research attempts on the topic.
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CHAPTER I:
RESEARCH FOUNDATIONS
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CHAPTER I:
RESEARCH FOUNDATIONS

I am starting in Chapter I with the research foundations where I am stating my
research problem which is to what extent Kaldor’s theory is applicable and
useful to explain/understand the wars in Yemen and Libya between 2011 and
2020? Then, I am explaining the significance of this thesis as it ignites the spark
for researchers to dig deeper into Mary Kaldor’s theory of New Wars and apply
its hypothesis to real cases.
Afterwards, I am showing my methodology in tackling my research problem
which is mainly the positivist historical process tracing approach with the
comparative case study methodology by choosing Libya and Yemen as my case
studies from 2011 till 2020, which would help me to understand the
developments through which warfare went from the pre-Cold War era up till
today. At the end of this chapter, I am shedding the light on the limitations that
affected my research work and how future research should tackle this theory in a
more comprehensive and inclusive way.
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I. I Research Problem
The main question that this thesis seeks to answer is; To what extent Kaldor’s theory is
applicable and useful to explain/understand the wars in Yemen and Libya between 2011
and 2020? Then, I am intending to answer as well other topic-related questions such as;
Is contemporary warfare different from the pre-Cold War era? And How did globalization fuel
contemporary intrastate conflicts? Also, I want to know if our understanding of such new
warfare would help in formulating better policies aiming to control/manage them or not?
The main hypotheses that I am testing throughout the thesis are;
H0: Kaldor’s arguments about identity politics, state failure, war economy as core features
of contemporary intrastate wars (new wars) are still relevant and useful to explain the breakout
and the continuation of the current wars in Libya and in Yemen.
H1: Kaldor’s theory is neither relevant nor useful to explain the current wars in Libya and
Yemen.

I. II

Research Significance and Objectives

I am intending to explain Kaldor’s elements of the New Wars theory, then apply them
systematically and in-depth to the Libyan and the Yemeni cases from 2011 up to 2020. This is
to see how useful would be the theory of New Wars in interpreting or understanding the
ongoing protracted wars in both countries.
Indeed, many accept this diversity or “newness” in warfare and use such terms, as for
instance “Hybrid Wars” or “Wars of the Third Kind”. I am arguing, however, that Kaldor’s
framework aims to be more conceptually encompassing, and emphasizes the social dynamics
of the current global era. However, it is also controversial. This is why this thesis would be an
addition to the debate because in addition to the critical assessment of the theory, it aims to
reach a decision either to support, modify, or refute its claims based on systematic empirical
findings of the Libyan and Yemeni wars which no author has tested the theory on yet.
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I. III Methodology
In this thesis, I am mainly using the positivist historical process-tracing approach with the
comparative case study methodology. The process-tracing approach allows me to trace the
causal relationship between my dependent variable (the onset of ‘new wars’), and my
independent variables (globalization, identity cleavages within the states, states collapse or
failure, war economy incentives). Also, it allows me to understand the developments through
which warfare went from the pre-Cold War era up till today. Furthermore, the comparative
case study methodology is mainly designed to put cases of concern under the academic
microscope, which shows details and patterns that can be used as explanations for the dramatic
changes in the topic, which serve the main purpose of the thesis.
The thesis is following the deductive approach that starts with a general hypothesis, then
reaches a certain conclusion by breaking up the theory’s core assumptions and test them on
certain cases. Moreover, the data will be mainly collected from secondary resources (books,
articles, journals, ..etc), Moreover, I am relying on a mixture of both qualitative and
quantitative data, in order to back up my assumptions, and to help in developing a parsimonious
thesis that can be easy to be built on in future academic efforts.

The relevance of the cases to the debate
The Libyan and the Yemeni cases were chosen over the time frame from (2011 to 2020)
due to two main reasons; the first reason is that there is little scholarly work that has been
done on those cases from the New Wars’ perspective over that period. While the second reason
is that they follow the (Most Different System Design ‘MDSD’) methodology, as the Libyan
and the Yemeni cases started from the same point, which was portrayed in different papers and
in the media as popular revolutions driven by socio-economic grievances, thereafter, the
situation turned into a whole different story, with a violent non-state actor (Houthis) in Yemen
are fighting both the Yemen “weak” government and the Saudis for backing the Yemeni
government. While in Libya, it is more or less two ‘quasi’ governments with organized armies
fighting for the political control of the tribal-divided state of Libya after the death of its longserved president General Muammar Al-Qaddafi, and there are other Jihadi armed groups and
militias fighting them both.
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Since the eruption of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2010, many scholars and researchers
have studied the driving factors for the protracted wars that followed the Libyan, Syrian, and
Yemeni popular uprisings. There was no previous literature that tested Kaldor’s theory on any
of these cases. However, Artur Malantowicz’s article in 2013 was the first attempt to
operationalize Kaldor’s theory on an Arab Spring case which is Syria. Malantowicz embraced
Kaldor’s arguments about the type of actors, new modes of warfare, and war economy
incentives, nonetheless, he argues that ideology is still present and still driving countries to
conflicts, not identity politics as Kaldor has been stressing (Malantowicz, 2013).
However, this paper as mentioned before focuses on the Libyan and the Yemeni cases, as
by far a second expanded empirical attempt to measure and assess the relevance of Kaldor’s
thesis on Arab Spring cases, after almost two decades from her book. So, if we looked into
some relevant works on both cases, we could see that identity politics manifests itself as a
major factor behind the ongoing crises in Libya and in Yemen (Heydemann, 2015).
Al-Hamzeh Al-Shadeedi and Nancy Ezzeddine argue that “tribalism” is what has been
used in the mobilization of the Libyans for the March 2011 uprisings, which gradually led to
the current conflict (Al-Shadeedi and Ezzeddine, 2019). Other scholars argue that General
Muammar al-Gaddafi’s rule was divisive, which led to many ethnic and tribal issues (Vira and
Cordesman, 2011: 6). Moreover, the growing role of the non-state actors in the Middle Eastern
conflicts in general and in the Libyan crisis in specific has been observed by scholars like
Bahgat Korany (2019) and Lacher (2019). An estimation made by Vincent Durac shows that
in 2014 there were 1,600 militia groups in Libya, ranging between Islamist and non-Islamist
groups (Durac, 2015: 38).
State fragility is also a crucial part of the new wars debate. Both Yemen and Libya have
been included in the latest Fragile State Index by the Fund for Peace, with Yemen as the ‘Most
Fragile State’ in 2019, and Libya as a one-step before joining Yemen in the same category (The
Fund for Peace, 2019). Richard Ware in his brief paper to the British House of Commons shows
how the political, economic, and social situations in Libya are difficult and complicated after
2011, that is mainly because the Libyan government turned into a “failed” state after the fall of
Gaddafi in 2011 (Ware, 2018).

18 | P a g e

Furthermore, the Yemen government is still facing serious challenges ranging from “an
ongoing conflict against localized combatant groups in the far North, rising separatist sentiment
in the South, a growing terrorist insurgency from within Yemen’s borders, and threats to the
state’s very survival in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring.” (Lewis, 2013: 3), this drove the
state to the brink of failure and fragility. In the past two years, it seems that Yemen has already
fallen into the failure trap, and then both Libya and Yemen are experiencing “new” kinds of
wars, which will be tested in this thesis.

I. IV Limitations
Libya and Yemen are still struggling to overcome the consequences of the Arab Spring,
there are still conflicts going on among different factions in both states. The blurring line
between actors’ motivations and objectives is hindering the accuracy of my assumptions, as it
is difficult to put a decisive criterion to identify them. Moreover, the involvement of
international actors complicated the situation in both states, and the lack of research on the new
wars’ theory and its application to cases rather than Kaldor’s cases is also restricting my
conclusions.
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CHAPTER II:
NEW WARS THEORY
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CHAPTER II:
NEW WARS THEORY

In Chapter II, I am delving deeper into the theory of new wars and the
academic history of theses on the changing warfare after the Cold War,
then the features of the new wars theory, eventually, I am ending this chapter
by showing the academic critique that was directed toward Kaldor’s
theory, and how she defended her new framework.
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II. I The Evolution of Warfare: How the World Moved from ‘Old’
to ‘New’ Wars
In an attempt to break mainstreams, Sven Chojnacki has reformulated the concept of
“war”. He believes that the pre-Cold War understanding of wars and conflicts, in general,
should be reconsidered to adapt to the changes in warfare after the Cold War. Then, he
distinguishes between three types of wars; 1) Inter-state wars which take place between two
or more sovereign states. 2) Extra-state wars are between a sovereign state and non-state
actors outside its territory. 3) Intra-State wars are between a government and non-state
actor(s) within the same state. 4) Sub-State wars happen between non-state actors within the
same state (Chojnacki and Reisch, 2008: 234; Chojnacki, 2006).
In that regard, scholars like Martin Van Creveld (2002), Herfried Munkler (2003), and
Mary Kaldor (2012, 2013) believe that the change in warfare has to get enough attention from
policy-makers -even before scholars- because that would help them in formulating better and
effective polices, hopefully, to control and to stop these brutal wars. They also believe that
Clausewitz’s ideas in “On War” (1874) are becoming obsolete and unsuitable for
understanding contemporary wars and conflicts, as most of the conflicts today are considered
to be “intra-state” wars, they are becoming more brutal, complex, and longer than those before
1991. For Kaldor, this has a lot to do with the emergence of globalization and with the
continuous innovations in communication and economic sectors that led to the spread of
identity politics, states failure, adoption of war economies, and the endurance of intra-state
conflicts.
Hence, there were new explanations as well as new types and names of “wars” have been
developed to understand the emerging trends after World War II. From “Wars of the Third
Kind” (Holsti, 1996) to “New Internal Conflicts” (Snow, 1996) to “Hodgepodge Armed
Conflicts” (Henderson and Singer, 2002). There has been rich literature on the onset of wars
and conflicts, also on the changing warfare in the post-Cold War era. Nevertheless, the most
debatable work in that respect is what was written by Mary Kaldor titled “New and Old Wars:
Organized Violence in a Global Era” in 1999 and then it was officially published as a book in
2012. However, in order to better understand the reasons and the main features of Kaldor’s
theory, I am shedding the light in the following section on the core scholarly attempts to
identify the new modes of warfare, but we have to know first the conventional understanding
of warfare that was written by Clausewitz in 1832.
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a. Clausewitz’s Old (Classic) Wars (1832)
In his remarkable book “On War”, focusing on inter-state wars, Clausewitz described the
war as “a true chameleon” that is “forever changing and adapting its appearance to the varying
socio-political conditions under which it is waged” (Cavaleri, 2005: 10). He then defined “war”
as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” (Michael & Peter, 1984: 75), but for
him, any theory or attempt to understand war without paying close attention to its “trinity” that
is composed of; hatred and animosity that is related to the people, probabilities that are set by
armies’ generals, and the political logic behind the observed war as it is a rational act belongs
to reason, will not be sufficient and it would contradict with the reality (Ibid, 89).
The industrialization revolution helped the states during the Napoleonic Wars in the
nineteenth century to mobilize many soldiers through conscription, and they were able to fund
their battles with their centralized economies, which helped in forming the mode of warfare
that was dominant until the Cold War. On the reasons behind the power of the states in that
era, Martin Shaw argues that “the institutions of warfare fed off industrial capitalist society,
creating mass armies fed by conscription from increasingly disciplined workforces; militarist
politics fed by mass parties and a mass-circulation press; as well as mass-produced weaponry
in distinct state-protected military-industrial sectors.” (Shaw, 2000: 175). Accordingly, the
“mode of production” during that era played a huge role in deciding the “mode of warfare” by
enhancing states’ power and eventually gave them the ability to fight “total wars”.
Therefore, according to Clausewitz’s definition of “war”, a war can only be a physical
conflict between nation-states with clear objectives revolving around the interests of each
combatant nation-state, and thus wars were fought based on “political” motivations (Kaldor,
2012: 17-18). Additionally, the nation-state was the sole responsible entity to establish an army
with a full right to use violence whenever the state’s interests are endangered. Moreover, all
the funding needed to build the army was raised through a very centralized procedure, that
mainly starts with collecting taxes from the citizens as a compulsory due payment to keep
providing safety and security for them (Ibid: 19-20).
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Kaldor analyzed what she labeled as “old wars” and made a comparison between the
nature, goals, and funding of wars from the 17th century till the late 20th century in the following
table. It is an obvious observation from that comparison that the mode of warfare and the nature
of wars have been changing since the 17th century, which strengthens Kaldor’s argument and
adds another motivation for us to know how they look like today and how we can improve our
response to their damaging effects.
Table (1): The Evolution of Old Wars

1

Moreover, by using the Clausewitzian conception of wars, we can clearly distinguish
between what is considered a public or a private activity, what is internal and external, what is
politically or economically motivated, who is a civilian and military soldier, and finally
between who has the legitimate right to use violence and who is criminal (Kaldor, 2012: 22).
Hence, the “old wars” were “fought by centrally controlled, permanent, full-time professional
armed forces in the service of the state.” (Holsti, 1996: 29).
However, Clausewitz didn’t expect that his conception started to change fundamentally
with scholars trying to analyze the new changes in warfare after the Cold War, the following
section shows some of these attempts before they were finally crowned by Kaldor’s “New
Wars” theory.

1

Source: Kaldor, M. (2012). ‘New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era’. Polity Press, Third Edition.
p.16
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b. Wars of the Third Kind (1988)
The first scholarly attempt to analyze the changing nature of warfare came even before
the official end of the Cold War with Edward Rice in 1988. Rice focused on conflicts in the
“rural” and “underdeveloped” Third World countries like; Afghanistan, Burma, China,
Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaya, the Philippines, Algeria, Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Nicaragua, then he described these conflicts as “wars of the third kind” as
“these wars were not prosecuted as the conventional wars of eighteenth and nineteenth-century
Europe, wars of the first kind, or in the manner expected of nuclear wars, wars of the second
kind.” (Rice, 1988: 1).
For Rice, these conflicts cannot be described as “guerrilla wars” because the reliance of
the wars’ adversaries on the guerrilla tactics might not be permanent, and sooner or later these
conflicts would turn into war battles that resemble the magnitude and methods of the “wars of
the first kind”. Wars of the Third Kind according to Rice might erupt mainly because of the
“rural nature” of the Third World countries, as those groups who resort to guerilla operations
find a “supportive” environment in these underdeveloped countries to pursue their political
goals, and when they were suppressed, they were “radicalizing” their methods (Ibid; 51-53).

c. Low-Intensity Conflicts (LICs) (1991)
With that notable decline in the occurrence of the inter-state wars after the end of
World War II in 1945, Martin Van Creveld as a prominent military historian believes that
conventional wars are “withering away” (Van Creveld, 1991: 40). In addition to that, he attracts
the scholars’ attention to a new type of war that is changing the long-held perceptions of major
wars, which are the “Low-Intensity Conflicts, LICs”. The LICs are mainly occurring in
developing countries, and they don’t occur between two “regular” armies, instead, one part
would be an army, while the other part would be any of terrorists, guerilla fighters, or other
private militias (Ibid).
Lewis B. Ware is supporting the claim that (LICs) are prevailing, and will remain the
dominant type of armed conflicts in the future instead of major inter-state wars, however, he
believes that “low-intensity conflict has increased proportionately to the weakness of the state
system” in the Middle East. He explained the weakness of the statecraft in that region due to
many factors such as the colonialism legacy, corruption, and the slow economic growth and
prosperity (Ware et al. 1988: 2).
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The LIC is a new term in the military field, its synonym is “non-international conflict”
which is also a renewed term from the traditional terms of “civil war” and “revolutions”, as
they happen when conflicts escalate to target civilians rather than military soldiers, and when
they are being fueled by ethnic or ideological causes rather than political objectives that were
fueling inter-state wars (Green, 1997: 493). It is important to note that the term “low-intensity”
here doesn’t refer to the severity of the conflict, but “It is a term used to indicate that the conflict
is not between recognized states nor that any major power is directly involved” (Ibid).
Moreover, a LIC can be defined as “a political-military confrontation between contending
states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among
states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies”
(Wah, 2000: 1). Most importantly, they are mainly “intra-state” conflicts, therefore, they are
not governed by international laws, but they follow the domestic regulations of the states where
they are being fought (Ibid).
The reasons behind LICs might be a bad ruler who badly treats his citizens and doesn’t
concede to his advisers, therefore, the citizens along with those from the ruler’s circle who
don’t agree with his authoritarianism revolt against him, in this situation, there might be an
army fighting a non-combatant group of people which will then be considered as a LIC. The
point here is that those who jumped from the ruler’s circle to join the citizens and fight him
might be using that conflict as a cover for predatory activities aiming at seizing the power and
the territories from the ruler’s hand at the end (Wah, 2000: 1).
It is believed that LICs are generally taking place in the Third World, and they affect
global security in one way or another, they can be waged using different political, economic,
informational, and military instruments. Also, they range from “combating illegal drug
trafficking, terrorism and counter-terrorism, insurgency and counter-insurgency, and other
special operations needed to counter activities which threaten security and require a
government response - whether revolutionary or non-revolutionary, political or non-political”
(Ibid).
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d. People’s Wars (1996)
Inspired by Rice’s “wars of the third kind”, Kalevi Holsti shed the light on the “peoples’
wars”, which are mainly “guerilla campaigns fought by militarized communal groups against
either government forces or other militarized groups within the states.” The crucial point in
Holsti’s “peoples’ wars” is that the distinction between those who are combatant and noncombatant is blurred, that is mainly because “members of rival communal groups are targeted
out of fear that their membership may be a source of potential power for their rivals.” (Holsti,
1996: 36-38).
It is important to note here that Holsti apparently was referring to “national liberation”
conflicts, where there are “no fronts, no campaigns, no bases, no uniforms, no publicly
displayed honors, and no respect for the territorial limits of states” (Ibid), as these wars aim at
ending colonization. Therefore, it was important to see how Holsti in 1996 was able to see the
changes in warfare and distinguish these new conflicts from the nineteenth century inter-state
wars.

e. Post-Modern Wars (1997)
The third stage of the evolution of the literature on the changing of global warfare came
when Chris Gray describes the Vietnamese War that happened during the Cold War era (19551975) as the first “post-modern war”. These wars are mainly characterized by the use of
technology and advanced methods. Gray stresses the fact that modes of warfare have changed
significantly after World War II. Besides that, he believes that the modernity of wars lies in the
growing role of “technoscience”, or technology and information that became increasingly
involved in the military field, so with no doubt, any side of a conflict today would use advanced
weapons, or in Gray’s terms the “computer-assisted weapons” to be on equal foot with each
other (Gray, 1997: 22,247).
Gray way before Kaldor’s theory believed that “postmodern wars depend on international
tension and the resulting arms race that keeps weapons development at a maximum and actual
military conflict between major powers at a minimum” (Ibid: 23). Later on, Kaldor supported
Gray’s belief, as she emphasizes the fact that because the arms races among the states might
keep the manufacturing of the weapons growing but the actual inter-state wars will tend to
decline.
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f. Wars of the 21st Century (2003)
In describing the “wars of the 21st century”, Herfried Munkler thinks that there is an
ongoing “demilitarization of wars”, which creates a new form of wars that are using
asymmetric warfare. They are not conducted based on the pure military perception of
Clausewitz, rather they are targeting civilians, and being led by warlords and mercenaries
(Munkler, 2003: 18). He then describes the features of these “new” wars as follows: 1)
Asymmetric based on guerilla warfare, or the “long war of endurance” that keeps the enemy
under constant financial and logistical pressures, which force him to give up on the long-run.
2) Cheap weapons and small arms are being used rather than heavy artillery. 3) Targeting
civilians (Ibid: 9,15).

II. II

New Wars

The first thing that would come to anyone’s mind while reading Kaldor’s book title is
what is old and what is new war? There was and still is an intense scholarly debate about
Kaldor’s theory, but in the following part, I am shedding the light first on the main premises of
the theory, and then I am stating the main points on which the critics of Kaldor’s theory were
based on.
To start with the final and the most influential scholarly attempt by Mary Kaldor to
analyze and conceptualize the changing nature of the modes of warfare in the post-Cold War
era, we need to recall that the “old wars” according to Clausewitz were predominantly
“construction of the centralized, rationalized, hierarchically ordered, territorialized modern
state” (Kaldor, 2012: 17). However, in the period that followed the Cold War, innovations like
nuclear weapons and the growing role of “proxy wars” and globalization brought a huge change
to the modes of warfare, even during the Cold War period but especially after it. As a result,
the Clausewitzian vision of war seems to be obsolete and unfitting to understand the current
new forms of wars.
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What is new in Kaldor’s “new wars” attempt is that she believes that conflicts after the
Cold War became different and that “intra-state” wars dominated the world instead of the
“inter-state” wars. Kaldor’s “new wars” are new when it comes to their;
1)

objectives, or raison d’état, as she argues that wars of today are most likely to erupt
due to ethnic or identity cleavages instead of ideological or geopolitical motivations
as in the past. Not only Kaldor who ruled out the ideological motivations as the spark
for wars after the Cold War, but also scholars like (Berdal & Malone, 2000), then
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) who believed that wars are being fought due to economic
motivations and combatants’ greed rather than socio-economic grievances, and later
on Jenny Peterson argued that because wars allow warlords to benefit from illegal
activities like trade in natural resources and smuggling, wars are being fought
because of the belligerents’ greed, such as conflicts over the “blood diamonds” in
Africa (Peterson, 2006: 27).

2)

states’ powers eroded resulting in blurring the line that separates combatants and
the non-combatants, the public and the private ownership, and the internal and
external affairs.

3)

they are being financed by means of the “war economy” that might depend on
looting, smuggling, and other illegal methods rather than the conventional collection
of taxes in the “old inter-state wars”.

4)

they became more “asymmetrical” because of the rise of globalization and
technological advancement.

5)

there is a huge network of actors involved in the conflicts who might be either
mercenary, private security agents, or militias with each actor having his own
interests and objectives which prolongs the conflicts (Kaldor, 2006: 27).
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Therefore, based on Kaldor’s argument we can develop a brief comparison between the
“old” theoretical framework and her new one to understand the outbreak and the continuation
of the contemporary intra-state wars;
Table (2): Comparison between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Wars

Nature of

Old Wars

New Wars

Inter-State Wars

Intra-State Wars

Two or more sovereign states

Violent non-state actors

Conflicts
Actors

(paramilitary groups, self-defense
units, foreign mercenaries, foreign
troops from international
organizations)
Motivations

Objectives

States’ interests (e.g. national

Economic incentives + identity

security)

issues

Disarming the opponent or force him

Reaching power positions and

to surrender and make concessions

taking over territories through
popular displacement

Funding

(Centralized Economies)

(Decentralized Economies)

Through raising taxes, fighting

Through looting, plunder, robbery,

corruption and through maintaining

hostage-taking, illegal trade of

law and order to provide healthy

primary resources such as oil,

conditions for external support and

external support.

for the taxes-collecting process
Popular

Through reaching people’s hearts

Through spreading hatred and fear

Mobilization

and minds with the most commonly

among people by enforcing

nationalistic “patriotism” slogans

discrimination based on identity,
religion or tribal affinity

Targets
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Soldiers

Civilians

In order to understand the process of fighting new wars, the following diagram -figure 1shows that it all starts with the process of globalization. The desire of some actors for social or
political change after they saw other experiences from outside their country due to the global
openness that globalization has brought, makes them search for tools to mobilize sympathizers
and start their revolution, therefore, they might resort to particularistic identities to start their
war against the old system, then they try to dismantle the state and its institutions to take over.
The failure of the state to hold its legitimate monopoly of violence leads to the emergence
of numerous non-state actors who are hardly can be divided into combatants and noncombatants. Thereafter, those actors try to control territories by controlling the population, that
would be through forced displacements, rapes, and ethnic cleansing, consequently, civilians
will be the main targets for those violent political greedy groups. Actors in these wars depend
mainly on a decentralized war economy that includes looting, illegal trade, plundering, and
ransoms. All of these processes happen intertwined and might happen parallelly.
Figure (1): The Process of New Wars
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Theory Importance and Foundations
Kaldor’s theory despite the critiques is still being considered a turning point in the
literature on civil wars and conflict resolution, as it gave scholars and policymakers a wake-up
call to pay attention to the ongoing dramatic changes in warfare. Therefore, contemporary
armed conflicts and peacebuilding strategies should be formulated within a new framework,
with new perceptions on why and how these conflicts are being fought, and how they are kept
going (Kaldor 2012, 2013).
The new wars thesis according to Kaldor doesn’t argue that there are completely distinct
“old” and “new” wars, as much of the characteristics of new wars existed even before the Cold
War, however, it is as Edward Newman states a “change in the depth and quality of the
analysis.” (Newman, 2004: 185). It provides a new theoretical framework, through which
scholars, as well as policymakers, should be able to understand the challenges and the
complexities that were brought by modern warfare, and also brought by the changes that have
been imposed on the nature of war and peace conceptions. The main objective of the theory is
to better understand modern wars and conflicts, and to develop more efficient and practical
policies to stop and prevent conflicts across the globe (Kaldor, 2013).
Kaldor believes that what most policymakers and scholars understand about war and
peace is still based on the characterizations of wars and conflicts that prevailed in Europe until
the nineteenth century, when “centralized, rationalized, hierarchically ordered, territorialized”
states were the main actors of wars, and their objectives along with their motivations were
identifiable and easy to interpret, that was by taking states’ interests into consideration (Kaldor,
2012: 15-17). That perception of wars can be traced back to Clausewitz’s characteristics of war
and peace in 1874, which Kaldor labels under the “old wars” perceptions.
Old wars or pre-Cold War wars according to Kaldor’s thesis, despite their devastating
repercussions on both soldiers and civilians, tended to be regulated by a set of globally
recognized rules of warfare (Kaldor, 2012: 19). Therefore, in order to justify her opposing
position to Clausewitz’s perceptions of war, Kaldor states that “The political narratives of new
wars are based on particularist interests; they are exclusive rather than universalist. They
deliberately violate the rules and norms of war. They are rational in the sense of being
instrumental. But they are not reasonable.” (Kaldor, 2012: 217).
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It is important to mention that new wars are longer, and more complicated than those in
the pre-Cold War era, as technological advancement created an “asymmetrical warfare”
(Arasli, 2011: 4), where all combatants are being equipped with ‘high-tech’ weapons, they
adopt advanced strategies, besides that, every side has his own means of getting more supplies
and funds to continue the conflict (Kaldor, 2012: 204).
Distinctions between who can be labeled as soldiers and those who are non-combatants,
along with the separation between what can be distinguished as a public or a private sphere,
what is military and civilian, and what is external and internal started to be blurred by the
conditions of the twentieth century’s total wars, and mainly because of globalization’s global
openness which is considered as the main point of Kaldor’s new wars theory (Kaldor, 2012:
27-30).
These post-Cold War wars are being fought based on different forms of identity politics,
be they tribal, religious, or ethnic motivations, they are taking place where the state ‘loses’ its
legitimacy, and where its institutions are weak to the extent that the state, in general, loses its
grip on parts of its territory, and therefore loses its “monopolization of legitimate violence”.
According to Kaldor, the phenomenon of “failed states” can be mainly observed after the fall
of “authoritarian” regimes, because armed groups find a good way through that power vacuum
that results from the fall of the strict and strong state military clutch and institutions to pursue
their agendas by their own rules, which basically don’t follow neither globally recognized
warfare rules, nor human rights principles (Kaldor, 2012: 81,183).

Features of New Wars
The core features of the wars in the post-Cold War era according to Kaldor are mainly; 1)
they are mostly intra-state (internal) conflicts. 2) there are multiple state and non-state
actors involved. 3) they increasingly depend on the power of technology and globalization
rather than heavy outdated artillery. 4) they are mainly fought because of particularistic
identity issues and they are not driven by ideological or geopolitical motivations. 5) they are
predominantly taking place in weak (failed) states. 6) they are being funded by methods of the
“war economy” such as illegal trade, looting, and smuggling. 7) civilians are in many of them
the main targets. 8) international actors are actively engaged in almost all of them for their
own interests.

33 | P a g e

a. Location: Intra-State (Internal) Conflicts
Major wars among nation-states that Sven Chojnacki categorizes as ‘Inter-State Wars’
(Chojnacki & Reisch, 2008: 234; Chojnacki, 2006) were in decline since the end of the Cold
War (Kaldor, 2012: vi) until they have merely disappeared like “snow under the sun” (Creveld,
2002: 3-4).
The world witnessed 47 armed conflicts from 1988 until 2007, only 4 of them were armed
conflicts between states (Iraq/Kuwait 1991, Chad/Libya 1994, Ethiopia/Eretria 1998,
U.S.A/Iraq 2003), while the rest were considered ‘Intra-State Wars’ (Yilmaz, 2007). Therefore,
intra-state wars account for almost 90% of all global conflicts since the 1990s, while 30-40%
of them were most likely to “recur at any moment” (Jackson, 2007: 121, 212). This argument
is also supported by the statistics shown by Max Roser, as he shows the decline of wars between
“Great Powers” (Roser, 2016). Moreover, according to the World Development Report of
2011, inter-state wars are becoming “relatively rare” along with a decline in other major armed
conflicts and battle deaths (World Bank, 2011).
The following graph clearly shows that global trends in armed conflicts from 1946 until
2019 show that inter-state wars are diminishing in the face of the growing societal (intra-state
wars):
Figure (2): Global Trends in Armed Conflicts 1946-2019

2

2

Source: Marshall, M. & Cole, B. (2014). ‘Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility’, Vienna,
VA: Center for Systemic Peace.
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b. Context: Globalization and the Emergence of New Weapons and Failed Sates
Only less sophisticated and light weapons are involved in new wars unlike in major interstate wars, however, they tend to be more brutal and bloodier than other conflicts (Creveld,
1991, 44). Adding to Creveld’s point, Holsti says that there is a large spread of “small arms”
like “rifles, grenades, Kalashnikovs, plastic, and small rockets” in the “wars of the third kind”
(Holsti, 1996: 132).
When Munkler talked about a “demilitarization of war”, he meant that wars in the postCold War era aren’t only depending on armies and the conventional battles’ strategies, there
are new actors and new strategies involved in these newly emerged conflicts. Moreover, there
is a “dehumanization of warfare”, which means that humans aren’t necessarily involved in the
war-making process as technological innovations are allowing machines to take the human part
in conflicts. Using new complex advanced weapons such as drones, cruise missiles, satellites,
weaponized robots, and other new smart weapons has been the easiest way for combatants in
new wars to achieve large gains without losing their human assets.
From that point, there has been a huge discussion about the new “Lethal Autonomous
Weapon Systems” which are a “special class of weapons systems that, once activated, can
identify and engage a target without further human intervention” (Pedron et al., 2020: 2).
Without human rationality or thinking, these weapons can cause large human causalities with
no discrimination between combatants and innocents or civilians, this has been an international
concern as well because such weapons can be easily used by militias, terrorists, and separatists
who are usually don’t comply with international laws, or respect human rights (Ibid).
Furthermore, communications became unlimited and borderless with the fast-growing
globalization in the period that followed the Cold War. It is now easier for militias, criminals,
warlords, and everyone involved in a conflict to reach and gain more supporters or
sympathizers from anywhere. Hence, new wars are mainly characterized by the huge usage of
new different communication channels, as Paul Williams interpreted that the paramilitary
movements “use the new media to publicize their actions, promote their cause and air their
grievances” (Williams, 2008: 181).
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It is an obvious common belief among new wars theorists that there is a positive
correlation between state erosion along with the breakdown of its institutions and the eruption
of the new war, that is mainly because coherent, healthy, and strong state institutions mean that
there is stability and development, on that point, Herfried Munkler stresses on the correlation
between the phenomenon of “failed states” and the occurrence of new wars (Munkler, 2003:
16). A “failed state” as a term defined by the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) is “a state
that can no longer perform its basic security, and development functions and that has no
effective control over its territory and borders” (CSRC, 2006).
The literature on the concept of failed states is rich and scholars have analyzed the concept
from different angles such as (Zartman, 1995 & Rotberg, 2003 & Bilgin; Morton, 2004 & Bøås;
Jennings, 2007 & Brooks, 2005 & Chomsky, 2006 & Collier, 2007 & Di John, 2010 & Call,
2011). However, in order to better understand the term “failed state”, we can refer to Zartman’s
simple definition that describes the failure of the state as its failure to perform the basic
functions of a state such as controlling its people and its territories, providing transportation,
electricity, ..etc (Zartman, 1995).
However, I borrowed Potter’s comprehensive definition which refers to failed states as
“tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested by warring factions”, he then
continues his definition by mentioning that they can be defined in terms of their “demise of the
practical operation of governmental functions for an internationally recognized state” (Potter,
2004: 4). From the international law perspective, a “failed state” has 3 main characteristics
which are; 1) an absence of state institutions. 2) intensive violence. 3) the need for humanitarian
intervention. (Bianic et al., 2003: 15).
Holsti observes that most of the ethnic problems emerge in places where the state or the
national government is weak and unable to fully control its territories, and he specifies Africa
as the most commonplace for weak states, then the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and the
former Soviet republics. Then, he believes that a country that struggles to keep its government
from falling and faces internal challenges is on its way to have new wars as it was described
previously (Holsti, 1996: 130).
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The fast-paced growth of globalization and the huge rise of the capitalist models created
huge disparities among the states, especially between the North and South as well as East and
West states. These disparities also created what is nowadays being labeled as developed and
developing states. For the developing states, it is a continuous struggle to stop the waves of
poverty, instability, and inequality which pushes these states into an indefinite circle of
insecurity that later on leads them to be “failed states”. This explains why Holsti specified
Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and the former Soviet republics as common
places where there are failed states.
Globalization has its fingerprints on the growing erosion of states in the post-Cold War
era, which is mainly because globalization broke all the boundaries that were isolating people,
and institutions, and opened the door for global interconnectedness, alliances, and global
networks. Therefore, the state’s ability to hold its territories under its control began to erode in
front of such global openness and connections between local armed groups and foreign
supporters.
Building on that point, Kaldor mentions that “the state's monopoly of violence has eroded,
from above and from below” (Kaldor, 2013: 4). First, from below because of globalization
that has been increasing inequality among states, consequently, it has been weakening states’
institutions including their armed forces, police, and courts which leads to their inability either
to provide essential and basic public services or to maintain their monopoly of violence.
Secondly, there is the erosion of the state monopoly of violence from above because states
became increasingly embedded in a set of international rules and institutions that force the
states to concede some of their authority to the authority of the international institution that can
decide on behalf of the whole member states such as the European Union (Ibid).
Having strong democratic institutions is considered a condition for stability and state
coherence, thus a country failing to maintain its democratic values or its institutions would
most likely turn into a “failed state”. For scholars like Larry Diamond, developing countries in
the post-Cold War era are still struggling to have a smooth democratic transition, because he
believes that democracy has been a superficial phenomenon for such developing states, as they
were “blighted by multiple forms of bad governance: abusive police and security forces,
domineering local oligarchies, incompetent and indifferent state bureaucracies, corrupt and
inaccessible judiciaries, and venal ruling elites who are contemptuous of the rule of law and
accountable to no one but themselves” (Diamond, 2008: 38).
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It is important to notice as well that a strong state army is a pre-condition for a strong state
because according to Kaldor “the establishment of standing armies under the control of the
state was an integral part of monopolization of legitimate violence which was intrinsic to the
modern state.” (Kaldor, 2012: 19). Therefore, the armed groups in new wars find the areas
where the state power is weak in perfect spots where they can use violence and intimidate the
people to keep them on their side and use them to claim political power in the state. These
groups are usually engaged in “highly visible atrocities – executions, torture, sexual violence,
suicide bombings, planting landmines, looting, and arson” to spread fear and force those who
are not in line with their identity or oppose their authority to escape (Kaldor & Chinkin, 2017:
14).
Another worth mentioning character of failed states is their bad economic performance
and the freeze of their economic development. When thinking of the reasons that led these
failed states to have devastating GDPs and low economic standards (Duffield, 2001), we can
say that when the state loses its legitimate monopoly of violence and its organized army become
fragmented, there will be a huge difficulty in keeping full control over its territory, this means
that taxes collection will decrease and more people would resort to tax evasion. Consequently,
this will increase the corruption and turn the state into fertile soil for identity politics and for
the rise of warlords (Kaldor, 2012: 96).
Before we dig deeper empirically into the causes of states’ failures, we have to know the
common criteria for failed states. Here we can refer to the Fund for Peace Failed States Index
where more than 179 countries across the world are being tested with 12 social, political, and
economic indicators to see whether a certain state is failing/collapsing or not. Those indicators
are; 1) State Cohesion Indicators (Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, Group
Grievance). 2) Economic Indicators (Economic Decline, Uneven Economic, Development,
Human Flight, and Brain Drain). 3) Political Indicators (State Legitimacy, Public Services,
Human Rights, and Rule of Law). 4) Social Indicators (Demographic Pressures. Refugees and
IDPs, External Intervention) (Fragile State Index, 2021).
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c. Actors: The Complexity of Actors
Clausewitz stressed the fact that major wars (inter-state wars) have nation-states as their
main actors fighting each other for the sake of their national interests, while in “new wars”
there is a “complexity of actors”. Not only states’ armies are involved, but also there is a wide
spectrum of non-state actors who are directly engaged in these conflicts for their own private
interests.
The multiplicity of the actors in new wars is mainly due to the weakness of the state and
its inability to enforce discipline and the rule of law on all of its territory. In addition to that,
those non-state actors are mainly depending on illegal sources to fund their fight such as
looting, smuggling, and illegal trade which is the reason why many of these “new wars” are
long and with mostly no clear signs of winners or losers (Kaldor, 2012: 125).
Moreover, in new wars, organized state armies are replaced by mercenaries who are being
hired by private stakeholders in the conflict, and when the state collapses those mercenaries
get blurred with state authority which allows warlords to take control of the state's government
to target the civilians in order to enrich themselves.
d. Goals: Identity-based Conflicts
There were widespread assumptions that most of the conflicts of the 1990s were civil wars
that were fought because of “ethnic” and not “ideological” reasons. However, in Kaldor’s
theory, some of these wars like the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina that lasted from 1992 to
1995 were “political” wars where combatants relied on “identity” and “ethnicity” motivations
to mobilize people to claim power and achieve their personal objectives (Shaw, 2000: 171).
Kaldor also believes that wars in the post-Cold War era are products of “fragmentative,
exclusive, and backward-looking” ideas that are different than spreading democracy, socialism,
or state-building as it was in the conflicts during the Cold War (Kaldor, 2005: 77-78) because
political leaders in these wars usually mobilize their supporters around “ethnic, racial or
religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power” (Ibid: 76), while in order for them
to justify their authority they spread insecurity and divisions among the people, so they don’t
challenge their powers.
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Additionally, Kaldor argues that “whereas guerrilla warfare aimed to capture hearts and
minds, the new warfare borrows from counterinsurgency techniques of destabilization aimed
at sowing fear and hatred”. Moreover, the fast communications allow for identity politics to
become not only local and global but also transnational, and its main effects are the diaspora
community support (Kaldor, 2012: 8).
Therefore, in new wars, instead of fighting battles, combatants tend to capture territories
by political means, and they take control of the population violently through “forcible removal
of a different identity or a different opinion” (Kaldor, 2013: 8). There is a correlation between
the collapse of the state and its core institutions and the practice of identity politics, this is a
result of the political elites’ exclusive policies, as those ethno-nationalist elites protect and
provide services to the people from the same identity or ethnicity which creates tensions among
the people, consequently, this puts the state in a circle of instability.
Building on that opinion, Hugh Griffiths believes that in news wars “elites do not
democratically define the boundaries of the territory. Instead, the elites try to homogenize the
population within the territory. For this, ethnic cleansing is commonly practiced, which
constitutes a violation of human rights.” (Griffiths, 2007). In addition to that, Andrews BellFialkoff argues that ethnic cleansing campaigns are often part of the economic motivations,
and they are not carried out by government troops but rather by “irregular civilian forces” (BellFialkoff, 1993: 119).
On the other hand, Ann Phillips argues that using identities for political mobilization is
heavily weakening the state’s ability to provide security for its citizens, as she says that
“security becomes privatized aligned with a specific ethnic or religious community. The result
is an increase in insecurity for all because no political entity is homogeneous” (Philips, 2016:
2). Then she continues by emphasizing that when providing the public good of security
becomes attributed to a specific ethnicity or religion, then it becomes a “zero-sum game” where
a certain ethnicity can be the guardian for other ethnicities and impose its conditions on them
in return for protecting them (Ibid: 3).
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e. Methods: Targeting Civilians
In new wars, the major actors who have intertwined interests in keeping the conflict
ongoing and are engaged in the violence are usually the remnants of the state army, militias
supported by the old government, mercenaries, and international troops, they all practicing
“ethnic cleansing” against the “others” who are mostly normal civilians (Shaw, 2000: 171172). Statistics presented by Munkler show that 80% of those killed and wounded since the
end of the twentieth century were civilians, while only 20% were soldiers on active service
(Munkler, 2005: 14). Also, he believes that in new wars “extreme violence is used to intimidate
an unarmed civilian population into doing whatever the armed group commands." (Ibid: 15).
According to Kaldor, there are different methods that those major actors in the new wars
can use to intimidate the civilians such as “mass killing and forcible resettlement, as well as a
range of political, psychological and economical techniques of intimidation” (Kaldor, 2012:
9). While Munkler thinks that the main purpose according to the new wars combating groups
from using violence against the civilians is to force certain groups who are not from their
identity or ethnicity to “supply and support certain armed groups on a permanent basis”
(Munkler, 2005: 14).
Another critical point to mention when it comes to civilians in new wars is that warlords
usually in new wars don’t attack civilians by themselves, instead, they are recruiting “child
soldiers” who are cheap, have no military ethics or codes, and are unaware of the interests of
their bosses or the consequences of using such violence against the civilians, they give them
lethal weapons to intimidate people in exchange for food, clothes, or any other basic needs
(Munkler, 2003: 17). The Advocacy Group Child Soldiers International estimated in 2017 that
“more than 100,000 children were forced to become soldiers in state and non-state military
organizations in at least 18 armed conflicts worldwide” (Mulroy et al., 2019). Furthermore,
The UN Office for Children and Armed Conflict stated that “the number of children either
forcibly or voluntarily fighting in the various conflicts in the Middle East and Africa doubled
in number in 2019” (Ibid).
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f. Funding: War Economy
Unlike the common understanding that wars are costly and cause huge economic losses,
new wars are profitable for its combatants, this is mainly because globalization allowed
different state and non-state actors in such conflicts to build cross-border networks that act as
their main source of funding and support. These networks might be consisting of diaspora
networks, NGOs, private security companies, mercenaries, local warlords, guerilla groups, and
agents of organized crime, or they can be sponsor states or international organizations who
have an interest in supporting a specific party over the others in these new wars.
It is important to mention a very crucial term that has been used by new wars theorists a
lot which is “war economy” as one of the main terms that describe state economies in the new
wars. A “war economy” according to James Galbraith is a “set of exceptional economic
measures taken during a certain period of time, generally defined by the existence of an armed
conflict (war), and it is characterized by the increase in public spending and centralization of
economic guidelines within the scope of public power, which starts to dictate the economy’s
mode of operation seeking to save it.” (Galbraith, 2001). Then he continues by emphasizing
that “In a war economy, the public obligation is to do what is necessary: to support the military
effort, to protect and defend the home territory, and especially to maintain the physical wellbeing, solidarity, and morale of the people. These may not prove to be easy tasks in the months
ahead” (Ibid).
Moreover, because of the complexity of the actors involved in the new wars, and thanks
to the interconnectedness caused by globalization, many non-state actors in new wars develop
what scholars like Munkler describes it as “shadow economies” to finance their fight and help
them pursue their interests in the new wars (Munkler, 2003: 10). With that in mind, Jonathan
Goodhand argues that most of the conflicts today are characterized by “innovative long-term
adaptations to globalization, linked to expanding networks of parallel (illegal) and grey (semilegal) economic activity.” (Goodhand, 2000: 87).
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Munkler and Kaldor believe that these new wars are a “profitable business” for warlords
and mercenaries, also Munkler borrows an old Italian saying that “war feeds on war” (Munkler,
2005: 17 & Kaldor, 2012: 6) That is mainly because those paramilitary groups and warlords
tend to use (looting, robbery, plundering, drug trafficking and other illicit forms of trade), and
both Munkler and Kaldor are blaming globalization for making it easy for those brutal and
greedy fighters to circulate their profits and even earn more to keep their fight going as long as
possible (Ibid: 16-18). Emphasizing that point, Munkler believes that “the war economy
represents a new type of dual economy, typical of peripheral regions exposed to globalization”
(Munkler, 2003: 13).
The interconnectedness and the fast-growing cross borders communications that came
with globalization have made Philippe Le Billon believe that despite new wars being mostly
intra-state conflicts, the "dynamics of these conflicts are rarely purely internal" (Le Billon,
2000: 3). Mats Berdal also believes that all the actors who are involved in the new wars are
considered “war entrepreneurs” because the war for them is “highly profitable and lucrative”
(Berdal, 2004: 484).
Unlike the supporters of the greed and grievance theories of civil wars, in new wars, there
is a blurred line between the economic and political motivations of the war actors, because
some actors might be involved in these wars for economic reasons, and they use the political
violence as their tool to achieve their interests, while those who are seeking political gains are
using illegal funding resources (smuggling, stealing, illegal trade, ..etc) to reach their objectives
(Kaldor, 2013).
g. International Interventions
When states collapse both state-oriented and non-state actors escalate their competition
over the control of the power and resources. In new wars, it is a common phenomenon to see
foreign actors hurrying to take sides in these wars as they want to benefit from the chaotic
situation either economically or politically which turns these wars into “global wars”.
However, sometimes international organizations and some regional powers want to stop that
chaos from spreading across the region and maintain stability, so they intervene diplomatically
to reach peaceful resolutions for the conflicts or they provide humanitarian assistance to save
people and avoid any humanitarian disasters.

43 | P a g e

Despite the fact that these humanitarian aids were meant to ease the deteriorating
humanitarian situations in these wars, it was proved that they weren’t enough in the case of
helping “failed states”, albeit they were being used by both state elites and warlords to fund
their fights and keep the conflict ongoing. According to Kaldor, warlords can profit from these
international humanitarian aids by controlling aid camps for the people in need (Kaldor, 2012:
11). Then, they prevent normal civilians from getting the foreign aid provision of food and
basic needs, which would leave them starving and put them in disease and poor conditions,
which consequently would keep the state in a failing position and keep the war active for longer
times. Munkler adds that international aid is “an inexhaustible source of profit to the warlords
as these warlords also get mixed among the suffering unarmed population and get to assert
their control from possessing arms.” (Munkler, 2005: 18).

II. III Theory Criticisms
Each scholar took a certain building block from Kaldor’s theory and either supported or
refuted it. Most of the scholarship on warfare speaks with quantitative data, that depends on
counting (battle deaths, civilians to military causalities, number of certain ethnic groups in
some states, ...etc), this has led to many reductionist conclusions, but in general, the debate was
enriched by new scholars who tried to fill the gaps either by adding qualitative analysis or by
other different ways. The following part highlights the main arguments regarding the main
premises of Kaldor’s new wars thesis.
It is a fundamental critique of Kaldor’s theory that there are no “new” types of intra-state
wars, since all the features that were mentioned by Kaldor to distinguish wars after the Cold
War from before it, were existing for a long time. Therefore, Edward Newman and Statis
Kalyvas believe that Kaldor did not base her argument on a thorough investigation of the
history of armed conflicts before the Cold War (Newman, 2004: 184; Kalyvas, 2001: 99).
Newman states that “all the factors that characterize new wars have been present, to
varying degrees, throughout the last 100 years.” (Newman, 2004: 185). Moreover, Sinisa
Malesevic argues that distinctions between intra and inter-state wars are problematic and loose,
so they should be traced very carefully, as some conflicts can be labeled under both types
(Malesevic, 2010: 98). However, in the following part, it becomes clear that Kaldor’s elements
of new wars are kind of new to those scholars’ old perceptions about intra-state wars.
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a) Growing spread of the Intra-State Wars in the Post-Cold-War era
One of the building blocks of the new wars’ theory is the assumption that intra-state wars
have been increasing since the end of the Cold War, while inter-state wars have been decreasing
since then (Hironaka, 2005: 6; Kaldor, 2012: 209; Dupuy and Rustad, 2018). However, some
statistics go against that claim and show that both inter-state and intra-state wars have been
decreasing in the post-Cold War era (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Newman, 2004; Harbom and
Wallensteen, 2005; Mack, 2005; Malesevic, 2010; Szayna et al., 2017).
In response to that critique, data shows that since the end of World War II and until 2007,
there were 178 wars, and according to the previously mentioned Chojnacki’s categorization of
wars, only 24 of them were ‘inter-state’ wars, while 118 were ‘intra-state’ wars (Chojnacki and
Reisch, 2008: 235). That was supported by Bethany Lacina, as she believes that civil conflicts
were dominating the period from 1990 to 2002 (Lacina, 2006: 276). Adding to that, around 20
million people have died and another 67 million have been displaced because of intra-state
wars (specifically civil wars) until 2005 (Collier and Sambanis, 2005: xiii). These numbers if
we can roughly say have been doubled in the last two decades, as the world is witnessing
vicious and complex intra-state wars in the Middle East and in other parts of the world.
b) Identity politics not ideologies, economic incentives or grievances
Another major critique against the theory of new wars questions Kaldor’s emphasis on
identity politics as the main driver for wars in the post-Cold War era, because it could be
ideologies (Malesevic, 2010: 9) or political and military motivations (Rice, 1988: 109; Holsti,
1996: 21) or economic incentives (Berdal and Malone, 2000; Berdal, 2003; Newman, 2004;
Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) or a mixture of “poverty, political instability, rough terrain and
large population.” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Furthermore, it seems that the argument about
weak states’ capacity, or about the fragility and governance issues as a driving force for internal
conflicts is also present in the new wars debate, as Bahgat Korany attributes the contemporary
major conflicts in the Middle East to the “resources gap” problem, this gap is mainly caused
by the governance issues in those countries that are witnessing and not identity divisions
(Korany, 2019).
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Notwithstanding, we can observe that most of the post-Cold War wars were initially
fought on the basis of identity discrimination and economic incentives instead of ideological
motivations (Berdal and Malon, 2000; Abazi, 2001: 2; Newman, 2004; Kaldor, 2012). Identitybased grievances can be ethnic, religious, or tribal, and such identity differentiations are usually
“fragmentative, backward-looking and exclusive.” (Kaldor, 2012: 80). This argument was
supported by the United Nations High Commissioner’s report of the world’s refugees in 2000
(UNHCR, 2000), then by the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty’s report on the responsibility to protect in 2001, which focused on intra-state
conflicts and the sufferings of civilians from exclusionary actions either by governments or by
armed groups (ICISS, 2001). In addition to that, the Fragile States Index by the Fund for Peace
in 2016 has shed the light on the growing tendency of ethnic and identity conflicts in the postCold War era (The Fund for Peace, 2016: 12).
c) The decline of the states’ monopolization of legitimate violence ‘State fragility’
What distinguishes between Kaldor’s and Clausewitz’s frameworks is the emergence of
‘globalization’, which has imposed a “liquid modernity” on the international system, that has
created different forms of instability (Malesevic, 2010: 100). One of the fundamental
assumptions of the theory of new wars is that globalization, or as we can call it “liquid
modernity” has pushed states into a “legitimacy crisis”, that led to the emergence of “failed
and fragile states” (Berdal, 2003; Berdal and Malone, 2000; Jung, 2003; Munkler, 2003;
Newman, 2004; Kaldor, 2012; Arasli, 2011; Banerjee, 2018; Korany, 2019). Therefore, the
theory of new wars is mainly referring to globalization as positively correlated with the
growing number of internal conflicts by weakening states’ capacities (Kaldor, 2012: 1; Ezcurra
and Manotas, 2015).
The literature on failed states is rich and diverse, many prominent scholars such as (States
find themselves unable to continue providing local services and producing public goods. That
is due to the lack of state revenues, and this situation allows some tribes and ethnic groups to
take over some territories utilizing the government’s weakness. They try to mobilize people by
providing such services instead of the state. Hence states lose their legitimacy with their
“legitimate right to use violence”, which paves the way for warlords and other violent nonstate actors to rise and shine at the expense of weak states.
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Only in weak “fragile” states, different non-state actors such as private military companies
or mercenaries and other opportunistic groups can find a ‘marketplace’ to sell their services
(Branović, 2011). These “marketplaces” are also great places where warlords and militias can
recruit more people and get stronger by manipulating them with their fake promises to improve
their lives.
Moreover, there is another source of states collapse which is the lack of states’ national
revenues, as it is a result of reductions in the local production of material goods in the face of
the rise of services (e.g. the know-how information, marketing, financial, digital and wireless
services) because they create an income which is much faster and easier than material products,
and this creates social, economic and ethnic divisions among people (Olzak, 2011). These
divisions urge armed groups to resort to looting, robbery, extortion, pillage, illegal trading in
drugs, or to depend on primary resources (e.g. oil, diamonds) and on hostage-taken along with
external support, either through direct funds from supporting groups or governments abroad or
even through using humanitarian assistance funds to serve their own agendas (Kaldor, 2012:
72-80, 107-108; Banerjee, 2018: 36-37). That explains why would the continuation of the
conflicts and not winning them will be in the best interest of such violent non-state actors
(Newman, 2004: 177).
d) Violent non-state actors as the leaders of new wars
A core argument of the theory of new wars is that the post-Cold War conflicts are not
following the ‘Westphalian’ perception of wars, which assumes that wars are mainly fought
among ‘sovereign’ states. However, non-state actors are leading the new conflicts either against
weak (corrupt) governments or against international coalitions of different states (Kaldor,
2012; Rigternik, 2014; Szayna et al., 2017).
For the sake of conceptual clarity, I am understanding the concept of ‘non-state actors’
as defined by Banu Baybars-Hawks and Sarphan Uzunoğlu, and by Ayush Banerjee as “entities
that participate in or act upon international relations, and such actors have sufficient power to
wield influence and cause changes even though they do not belong to established state
institutions.” (Hawks; Uzunoğlu, 2018: 1-2; Banerjee, 2018: 36-37). The concept also refers to
different types of non-state actors such as (international organizations, non-governmental
organizations, trade associations ...etc), I am specifying the ‘violent’ non-state actors who can
be (warlords, militias, paramilitary forces, insurgencies, terrorist groups, or gangs).
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According to the new wars’ thesis, violent non-state actors have been increasing since the
end of the Cold War to the extent that new wars are totally being fought by them, either against
other non-state actors or against governments. Sukanya Podder says that the number of nonstate actors has multiplied in the Middle East and in Sub-Saharan Africa in the period between
2001 and 2008 (Podder, 2012: 6). These groups found their way through the “modern liquidity”
that we have mentioned before as a result of globalization, also they are becoming more
“empowered by the globalization impact and diminishing role of states, and enabled by radical
ideologies, access to finance and open-source technologies” (Arasli, 2011: 1) which poses a
real global security threat.
Even the nature of violent non-state actors and their methods of fighting has gone through
a process of change, as they are becoming more “independent”, and they are tending to
resemble governmental and full state structures, which theoretically speaking turns them
almost into real “quasi-states” but without international recognition (e.g. ISIS and Hezbollah)
(Arasli, 2011: 2-3).
Shams Zaman believes that the reasons behind the rise of non-state actors in the Middle
East are the current political and socio-economic circumstances in the Middle East ranging
from “corruption, nepotism, joblessness, educational backwardness, and governance issues.”
(Zaman, 2012: 53), these circumstances are fueling radical Islamic groups such as Al-Qaeda,
Jabhat Al-Nusra, ISIS, and other non-state radical groups, as they help them to mobilize young
people on the bases of religion and identity under fake promises to make their lives better
(Zaman, 2012: 53-65). That also relates to Kaldor’s argument about the growing role of identity
politics in modern warfare.
e) Civilians are the main victims of new wars not soldiers
According to the new wars’ theorists, the main targets of the armed groups in new wars
are civilians not soldiers of national armies, as it has been known for inter-state wars, that can
be observed by following the increasing figures of civilian casualties of the modern conflicts
in comparison to military deaths (Kaldor, 2012: 210-213). However, critiques of this argument
state that there has been no change in the numbers of conflicts casualties, either on the civilian
side, or on the military side, and that genocides and guerrilla wars had higher rates of civilian
causalities than post-Cold War wars (Kalyvas, 2001; Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005; Melander et
al., 2007).
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On the contrary side from these critics, many studies and reports from international
organizations proved that civilian casualties have been increasing (The Carnegie Commission
on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997: 11; Newman, 2004: 178; Münkler, 2005: 14; Kaldor,
2012: 106; Rigternik, 2013). That drastic shift in warfare was explained by Colonel Dave
Wallace and Major Shane Reeves, who state that “Whereas the state actor must protect
civilians, the non-state armed group simply views civilians as an asymmetric warfare asset that
may be leveraged in order to gain an advantage against their state actor adversaries.” (Wallace
and Reeves, 2013: 15).
Targeting civilians is not the only violation of the humanitarian laws of warfare that
violent non-state actors are committing in new wars, they also tend to recruit children to fight
on their side, displacing ethnic and social groups, sexually assault women and girls and use
fear and intimidation against innocents to obey their rules and serve their interests (Kaldor,
2012: 54,98, 104-105). This explains why Kaldor has mentioned and stressed different times
on human rights violations as a crucial characteristic of new wars.
f) Technological advancements and the new mode of warfare
Despite the labeling being different, Omar Ashour mentions that since the last quarter of
the twentieth century, there has been a steady rise in the capacities of insurgents. Ashour argues
that the state’s brutal or passive behavior toward its citizens along with geographical conditions
and foreign support are the main sources that help insurgencies to survive and to override the
state armies (Ashour, 2018: 1).
Maybe the states’ misbehavior toward their citizens can be blamed for the rise and the
success of violent non-state actors, however, technological advancements caused by
globalization and the ongoing innovations, which produce new things and methods everyday
are considered “double-edged weapons”, as not only they have changed the pre-Cold war
warfare into new warfare characterized by brutality, protracted battles, and unpredictability,
but also they are helping violent non-state actors to change their tactics and to improved their
equipment and weapons. Hence, we can say that the global openness that globalization has
created is empowering those militias against states’ armies and international coalitions
(Malesevic, 2008; Hammes, 2019).
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Many armed groups today are using new tactics as there is a rise in acts like suicide
bombing by terrorists and violent non-state actors, also they have been using new weapons
such as the (Unmanned combat aerial vehicle “Drones”, surface-to-air missiles, improvised
explosive devices, and ballistic missiles). Furthermore, the death scale of such new devices is
larger than the traditional weapons and usually, the main victims are civilians, who might have
been around the targeted places by these weapons by a coincidence, or they were used as
“human shields” by these groups to rather protect their own manpower (Wallace and Reeves,
2013; Hammes, 2019).
It seems fictional and an exaggeration that such violent armed groups can conduct
“surveillance” operations to locate targets similar to what states’ armies are doing, however,
facts speak for themselves, as for instance the Iranian-backed armed group in Lebanon
‘Hezbollah’ has been using Iranian-designed drones called ‘Mirsad’, not only to locate Israeli
targets but also to bomb them using installed explosive devices (Wallace and Reeves, 2013: 6),
the same can applies to the Houthi rebels in Yemen and to Hamas in Palestine (Shiner and
Marijan, 2019; Hammes, 2019; Bergen et al., 2019).
The imminent threats posed by the spread of such lethal advanced weapons among
terrorists and armed groups can be observed through numbers, as there were 40 “civilian”
airplanes that were shot down by surface-to-air missiles fired by non-state actors since 1970.
Moreover, the increasing usage of the improvised explosive devices by almost 40 different
non-state actors killed 12,286 people in 2011 only (Wallace and Reeves, 2013: 9-10).
It is worthy of mentioning here that cyberattacks and the usage of information technology
either to steal valuable and sensitive data from the opponents or to destroy their systems are
also being used by violent armed groups in today’s conflicts, it is a new tactic to counterbalance the standardized armies with their heavy artilleries (Wallace and Reeves, 2013: 1213). Hence, it would be unrealistic to believe that warfare hasn’t changed since the end of the
Cold War or that globalization’s uncontrollable “modern liquidity” didn’t motivate
contemporary violent conflicts.
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A New Conceptual Shift in The Study of Intra-State Wars
Scholars have also raised critiques of Kaldor’s oversimplification in stating her
arguments, the lack of a thorough empirical backup for her assumptions, and the usage of
concepts that hold different interpretations without clear specifications (Hoffman and Weiss,
2006: Chojnacki, 2006). Kalyvas argues that the difference suggested by Kaldor between “old”
and “new” wars “is based on an uncritical adoption of categories and labels grounded in a
double mischaracterization” (Kalyvas, 2001: 99).
After deeply going through Kaldor’s points, I can say that it is a huge conceptual shift that
Kaldor’s thesis is proposing, as the common scholarly understanding of intra-state wars is that
almost all of them can be labeled under the concept of “civil wars”, however, if we looked into
the various definitions of “civil wars”, we can then refer to the definition used in the Correlates
of War project (CoW), as it gathers most of the common features of civil wars which are;
“internal military action, at least one thousand battle deaths, the involvement of the national
government, and the ability of participants to inflict casualties on opponents.” Moreover, “it is
assumed that civil wars can only happen within internationally recognized sovereign states that
have a minimum population of at least half a million persons.” (Singer and Small, 1994;
Sarkees, 2000: 129; Mundy, 2011: 280).
Nevertheless, the previous definition has a lot of debatable points that need an extended
part to talk about, but in the meantime, we can say that new wars are neither “civil wars”
(Kaldor, 2012: 210), as some scholars like Kalyvas has labeled them (Kalyvas, 2001: 99), nor
“Hobbesian” wars of all against all (Mueller, 2000: 62), instead they are “mixtures of war
(organized violence for political ends), crime (organized violence for private ends) and human
rights violations (violence against civilians)” (Kaldor, 2012: 207).
This doesn’t propose that new wars are completely different from civil wars. However, it
means that we should understand intra-state wars in the post-the Cold War era according to the
elements of Kaldor’s theory, instead of reproducing the same inefficient policies and revolving
around the same old perceptions to have better peacekeeping and conflicts resolution action
plans.
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II. IV Conclusion
What we can conclude from the first chapter is that the context of the current “wars” is
different than it was in the pre-Cold War era in one way or another. We have seen new methods,
goals, financial channels, actors, and even new war tactics. Wars between sovereign states
(inter-state wars) are declining, while wars within the states (intra-state wars) are growing.
The academic evolution in analyzing and understanding the changing mode of warfare
has provided a great base on which we can test our case studies in the coming chapters, but
what we will be mainly focusing on is the last scholarly attempt by Mary Kaldor about “new
wars”. If we can summarize Kaldor’s argument about the new wars, we can say that
globalization with its interconnectedness and openness increased the challenges that are facing
weak/corrupted states, which led to their erosion, then new non-state actors capitalized on that
moment and put their private interests above the people’s interest and went on an ongoing fight
against the remnants of the state institutions. Also, in new wars, there is a blurred line between
combatants and civilians, private and public ownership, internal and external matters, and
economic and political motivations which makes these wars prolonged conflicts with no clear
winners or losers except normal people who are being targeted by those militias to claim
political power and state control.
In the coming chapters, I am going to go in-depth into the Libyan and the Yemen wars
from 2011 until 2020, and I will be applying Kaldor’s characteristics of new wars on them to
see if that would help us to better understand these conflicts and therefore build new effective
peace plans, or it will not change or add anything, and I am starting by the Libyan war that
started in February 2011 in the mid of the unprecedented Arab Spring political phenomenon,
that ended up with removing long-ruling presidents Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia,
Muhammad Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Muammar Al-Ghaddafi in Libya, and Abdullah Saleh
in Yemen.

52 | P a g e

CHAPTER III:
THE LIBYAN WAR (2011-2020) THROUGH
THE LENS OF THE NEW WARS THEORY
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CHAPTER III: THE LIBYAN WAR (2011-2020) THROUGH
THE LENS OF THE NEW WARS THEORY

In Chapter III I am shedding the light on Libya from 2011 when popular protests
took the streets against the rule of the longest-serving leader in the Arab world,
Muammar Al-Qadafi, then I am ending my focus timeline with 2020 because of
the lack of recent comprehensive related studies.
I am applying Kaldor’s features of new wars on Libya to see how the theory of
New Wars would ever lead to a different understanding and analysis of the
conflicts and instability in this country or it would add no value to the ongoing
literature and policies concerned with the Libyan ongoing dilemma. So, I am
starting the chapter by showing the historical development of the case and how
we have reached the recent situation, then I am taking each feature of new wars
and applying it to each country. Therefore, I am testing whether such conflicts
can be described as New Wars in Kaldor’s terms or not.
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Figure (3): Map of Libya
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III. I Introduction
Libya is the fourth largest country in Africa, and the seventh-largest in the world
occupying roughly 680,000 square miles – most of it is desert - and sharing borders with four
strategically important countries, namely; Egypt from the east, with borders that spread along
1,115 kilometers, then Tunisia from the west, Chad and Niger from the south, and the
Mediterranean Sea from the north. It is important to note that Libya’s location was -and stillis a major factor in all the latest political and economic changes that happened in the country
in the last decade.
The oil-rich state was always full of dynamics and divisions throughout its history. From
the Greeks to Persians, then to Ottomans, Italians, and finally, to the British and French
colonizers, Libya was prey for great empires. On 24 December 1951, when the United
Kingdom of Libya was granted its independence by the United Nations from the Allies of
World War II (the United Kingdom, France), it was one of the poorest and most
underdeveloped states in the world, with %90 of the population are illiterate, and its people had
no significant political experiences to rely on in building their state (Aghayev, 2013: 193).
The first King to rule the Kingdom of Libya after its independence, King Idris Al-Senussi,
allowed the British colonizers to re-enter the country for the sake of helping him in developing
his country. The British workers discovered the oil in 1959, then Libya began to export it in
1963. King Idris was afraid of the long-term repercussions of that huge discovery, he said back
then “I wish you people had found water. Water makes men work. Oil makes men dream”
(Dumas, 2017). However, the oil discovery was a watershed in Libyan history, as the Libyan
economy and the name of Libya started to spread across the world and in the region as a
promising country with so many internal difficulties and divisions.
Nevertheless, the history of modern Libya can be traced back to the coup d’état -or what
was called Al-Fateh Revolution- that was led by the young Libyan officer Muammar
Muhammad Abu Minyar Al-Gaddafi and some other young militant officers against King Idris
in 1969 when he was getting treatment in Turkey. Afterward, Al-Gaddafi inaugurated the era
of the Arab Republic of Libya (Jamahiriya) in which Libya started to change altogether, and
he became the longest-serving president, and the political and socio-economic dynamics
changed until we have reached the date of February 2011, when a whole new Libya resulted
from the Arab Spring political waves.
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When we study the Libyan crisis through the lens of the new wars theory, we can many
of its features are already present in Libya, from the multiplicity of local and international
actors involved in the conflict each one for his own interests, to the collapse of the Libyan state
and institutions in 2011, to the practice of identity politics based on tribal affiliations to
mobilize supporters, to eventually the utilization of the country’s oil and other illegal resources
by the combatants to help them keep fighting to claim political power and cherishing the
ongoing power vacuum in the divided country.
This chapter applies Kaldor’s new wars’ features on the Libyan crisis from 2011 to 2020,
and it explores the potential benefit of the theory in better understanding the complex situation
in Libya in order to help policymakers to reach better solutions for peace and state-building. I
am starting with a brief timeline of the Arab Spring in Libya, then I am talking in-depth about
each feature of the new wars’ theory in the Libyan case.

III. II Background on Libya
a. Al-Jamahiriya Al-Libiya (1969-2011)
For 42 years, Libya was a one-man state without any formal institution to keep Al-Gaddafi
accountable for his decisions, he formulated what is today labeled as a “stateless society”
(Smits, 2013: 11). Al-Gaddafi considered tribal affiliation as the main criteria for employment,
promotion, and rewards in general, he was depending on oil revenues to keep his tribal alliances
and popular support base during his reign, although these tribal relations were not fixed all the
time, and they were shifting.
It is a common belief among the Libyans that Al-Gaddafi’s rule was fragmentative and
unfair, he strengthened the tribal divisions in the country to maintain his superior position as
long as possible, then he turned Libya into a rentier and socialist state in which all the basic
services like water, electricity, food, healthcare, and education were provided by the state, but
when it comes to civic and political freedoms, they were only granted to the “haves” who were
favored by Al-Gaddafi and owned most of the country’s wealth, while the “have-nots” were
the normal Libyans, who had no rights except getting their basic needs and work to earn their
lives in the field of oil and in business (Winer, 2019: 3-4).
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All promises that Al-Gaddafi has made when he inaugurated the new era of
Al-Jamahiriya, such as he will demolish all kinds of exploitation and discrimination, and that
he will give the Libyan people the opportunity to rule themselves through a direct democracy
were just delusions, as it was “an Orwellian nightmare, as rule by the masses in principle meant
control by Gaddafi & Co. backed by repression to keep the system going” (Gelvin, 2012).
Moreover, all the political power and decisions were in the hands of Al-Gaddafi, and he
was strongly against making any concessions to open the political field for the opposition. As
in his constitution -The Green Book- that Gaddafi made as to the holy book for the Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya in 1975, he allowed the Libyans to participate in the decision-making process
only through attending popular committees, congresses, and conferences, however, the final
decision was taken unilaterally by him. Additionally, he banned the formation of political
parties because for him they were not “the actual representation of the people of the state, as
they don’t get 100 percent votes, they might just represent 51 % of people, which is unfair to
the rest of 49%” (Gul, 2019), which made all political institutions in Libya weak and very
fragile (Winer, 2019: 5-6). That was in addition to the fact that Al-Gaddafi’s family and sons
enjoyed a very luxurious lifestyle that was not available to the normal Libyans (Pizzolo, 2020).
b. The Libyan Spring (2011-2012)
Thinking of the domino theory, the turn was on Libya to craft its way for a democratic
transition, as the echoes of the protestors’ voices that were coming from Tunisia, Egypt, Syria,
and Yemen were still in the air. It was kind of predictable that a dictator’s reign that lasted for
42 consecutive years would face calls for changes and reforms. It is according to the Green
Book that “Democratically, private individuals should not be permitted to own any public
means of publication or information. However, they have the right to express themselves by
any means, even irrationally to prove their insanity” (Al-Ghaddafi, 1976: 35-36) but that was
not the case when the Libyans wanted to practice their freedom of speech right and call for a
change in February 2011.
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As a result of such oppressive, selfish, and unjust rule, the Libyans decided to cherish the
Arab Spring momentum and go on the streets; First, they were asking for “vast political,
economic and constitutional reforms. The end of the violation of citizens’ rights, freedom of
opinion, freedom of expression, economic reforms aimed at reducing corruption and better
living conditions of the citizens” (Ben Lamma, 2017: 37). Then, when they found a brutal
response from Al-Gaddafi’s security forces, they called for the end of his dark rule of the
country.
Protestors were peaceful at the beginning, but the major spark that ignited the Libyan
armed conflict was the detention of the human rights activist Fethi Tarbel in the city of
Benghazi on February 15, 2011, as many Libyans have gathered in front of the city’s police
headquarters to call for his release, then the demonstrations escalated violently, and on
February 17th, activists called for the “Day of Rage” across the country, and then they went on
the streets and broke into armories and military barracks and picked the weapons to start the
fight against Al-Gaddafi stubborn regime.
Figure (4): A timeline for major events during the Libyan conflict against Al-Gaddafi
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Source: The Atlantic Council & United States Institute of Peace
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It didn’t take a long time for Al-Gaddafi’s political ship to sink, as, on February 20, the
Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel Jalil and Interior Minister Abdel Fattah Younes defected to
join the protesters. However, in an attempt to divide the protestors, Al-Gaddafi’s eldest son,
Saif Al-Islam, threatened the Libyans on February 21, 2011, that because of these violent
demonstrations, there will be “rivers of blood” and Libya will be divided into “15 Islamic
fundamentalist emirates”, which will augment the country’s divisions. However, the fear of
losing power forced Al-Gaddafi to order his army to crush the protestors on February 22, 2011,
which soon turned into a large-scale conflict between the Libyan army and loyal tribes to AlGaddafi and armed rebels and militias (Paula, 2011).
On February 25, the United States took a unilateral step to sanction Al-Gaddafi’s regime
over the brutal treatment of the protestors, then on February 26, the United Nations sanctioned
them as well and referred Al-Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court (ICC). After the
conflict was escalated between Al-Gaddafi with hired foreign mercenaries and the rebels, the
opposition to Al-Gaddafi’s regime formed the National Transitional Council (NTC) on
February 27, 2011, to rule the areas taken by the rebels from Al-Gaddafi’s forces. The council
was led by Al-Gaddafi’s former Minister of Justice, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, and it was based in
Benghazi, it was also the first step towards the prolonged tensions between Tripoli in the West,
where Al-Gaddafi and his supporters were still holding power, and Benghazi in the East, where
the rebels managed to take from Al-Gaddafi (Ibid).
The American President then, Barack Obama said at a TV press conference on March 3,
that Al-Gaddafi “has lost the legitimacy to lead” and asked him to step down. From the
17th of March 2011, the Libyan unrest turned to be a global conflict with the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) passing the Resolution 1973 that established a “no-fly zone” over
Libya, and the gave the green light to the international actors to use “all means necessary” to
protect civilian Libyans (Ibid). By September 22, 2011, Rebel forces gained control of
Zawiyah, Bab al-Azizia in Tripoli, Sabha, Jufra, and the oasis towns of Sokna, Waddan and
Houn.
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Eventually, after a harsh fight covered by NATO’s aircraft, the rebels killed Al-Gaddafi
in his hometown Sirte on October 20, 2011, and soon on October 23rd, the National Transitional
Council announced the “liberation” of Libya from Al-Gaddafi’s regime and their de facto
Head, Mahmoud Jibril announced that discussions started immediately to put a roadmap for
Libya after Gaddafi, starting with forming an interim government, then electing a constitutional
assembly, then holding parliamentary and presidential elections within a year from its
formation (Ibid).
c. Stateless Libya (2012-2020)
The death of Al-Gaddafi didn’t solve Libya’s problems, as the country fall into another
long conflict among militias and tribes over controlling the country, these conflicts were
somehow built on the discrimination that Al-Gaddafi had sewed before between Eastern and
Western Libya. So, on February 20, 2012, the city of Misrata held local council elections
without informing the NTC, and on March 6th, Cyrenaica announced that it will be a “semiautonomous” region which shows how politically divided was Libya in the post-Gaddafi era.
Afterward, the General National Council (GNC) was elected by popular voting on
July 7th, 2012, to replace the NTC, and it was led by the Muslim Brotherhood who won 17 out
of the 80 seats allocated to political parties and 17 independent seats, in addition, they were
backed by the United Nations (Rowan, 2019).
Chaos was not only political in Libya after Gaddafi, as on September 11, 2012, but also a
security problem, as Islamic militias linked to Al-Qaida stormed the American embassy in
Benghazi and killed the ambassador with 3 other embassy staff, and 10 Libyan security forces,
which made the people of Benghazi force the militias to leave the city and give it the Libyan
National Army (LNA) on September 22. Violence was ongoing in different parts of Libya since
then, and in August 2013, Ibrahim Jathran, who was a Federalist leader, and his allies seized
4 key oil terminals and demanded greater regional autonomy in the east (Ibid).
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A new spark for the continuation of the Libyan chaos came on February 3, 2014, when
the GNC that was dominated by Islamists decided to extend its mandate beyond February 7th,
which was the pre-settled date for their mandate, claiming that they want to give enough time
to a special committee to draft a new constitution, however, thousands have protested against
that illegal extension, and some Zintan militias threatened to attack Tripoli if that happened
which led many Libyan to call for replacing or dismantling the GNC and hold new elections.
Then, in the following month, new clashes erupted between Misratan militias and the Zawiya
Martyrs brigade over control of Libya’s oil terminals which complicated the situation much
further than it was (Ibid).
All that we have mentioned before was paving the way for a vicious cycle of violence that
would put Libya in square zero again, but what happened on May 16, 2014, was a watershed
in the Libyan crisis history when General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, who was the commander
of the Tobruk-based Libyan army and served before under Al-Gaddafi, announced on the
national TV that he took over Libya’s main institutions and the suspension of, that was in
addition to the suspension of the constitution (Ibid).
After General Haftar’s unilateral move, he launched Operation Dignity (Amaliyat
Al-Karama) with the help of some officers from the air and special forces who defected from
Al-Gaddafi in 2011 to get the Islamist forces out of Benghazi, but in return, Islamist forces
launched Operation Dawn (Fajr Libya) with the help of former fighters from the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (Al Jama’a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah al-Libye) and some Amazigh units and
foreign fighters. Then, in June 2014, a new House of Representatives was elected, but the
Libyan Supreme Court nullified the elections, so the HoR refused to convene in Benghazi and
held its first session in Tobruk, which augmented the country’s divisions and led to another
full-scale conflict in which foreign actors like Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Qatar,
and Egypt intervened all for their interests (Ibid).
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After the HoR refused to convene in Benghazi, there was a political and security
uncertainty, which helped the Islamist forces of Ansar al-Sharia to declare Benghazi an Islamic
caliphate on July 30th after capturing strategic areas of the city from Haftar’s forces. Then, in
August 2014, Libya Dawn, a coalition dominated by Islamist militias from Misrata, captured
Tripoli after a five-week battle with secular militias. However, on October 1st, General Haftar
regained control over Benghazi and pushed Islamists out of it. Afterward, the GNC declared
their full support to Haftar’s operation against Islamists, but on November 6, the Libyan
Supreme Court announced that the Tobruk government headed by Ahmed Maiteeq that resulted
from the parliamentary elections in May 2014 is illegal and doesn’t represent Libya (Ibid).
By the end of 2014. Libya had turned into what can be described as a “collection of citystates” as major Libyan tribes clashed with each other, but that didn’t mean that there weren’t
any alliances among them because some of them intersected with different tribes and formed
many tribal alliances (Fitzgerald & Toaldo, 2016). In that chaos, Islamic militias linked to ISIS
found a good opportunity to take over the city of Derna in eastern Libya, then on February 15,
2015, they slaughtered 21 Egyptian Christians which was a major incident that increased the
Egyptian involvement in Libya. Moreover, ISIS-linked militias managed to gain control of
Sirte, which was Al-Gaddafi’s hometown, and they kept expanding until they forced Misratan
militias to escape on June 1, 2015 (Rowan, 2019).
The peace process was revived in November 2015, when the UN then special envoy to
Libya Martin Kobler led the political dialogue among the Libyan factions in Morocco which
resulted in the Skhirat Agreement on December 17, 2015, when both the GNC and the HoR
with support from the UN agreed to established a unity government to rule Libya in these
critical times.
According to the deal, a Presidential Council (PC) was formed with 9 members and it was
led by Fayez al-Sarraj, who served as a Housing minister in Ahmed Maiteeq’s government in
May 2014, to appoint a new cabinet, however, the whole process was blocked many times by
different factors, but the US decided on March 13, 2016, along with the European states to
recognize the unity government as Libya’s legitimate government and called it the Government
of National Accord (GNA) (Ibid).
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The fight against the expansion of Islamist militias who were linked to ISIS in Libya
started with General Haftar’s Operation Dignity in May 2014, but in April 2016, the GNA
decided to take the lead in that fight to show and justify its power. So, they launched the
“Impenetrable Wall Operation” (al-Bunyan al-Marsoos) to expel ISIS militias from Sirte in the
west, while General Haftar’s operation during that time was expanding to Derna in the east.
Then the US launched intensive airstrikes on ISIS militias strongholds in Sirte and managed to
expel them from their last powerful district of Ghiza Bahriya (Ibid).
However, the end of ISIS’ growing role in Libya came on July 6, 2017, when General
Haftar announced the liberation of Benghazi from Islamists, but in January 2019, General
Haftar launched an offensive campaign again in southern Libya, and he justified that by
claiming that it was to purge terrorists and other criminal gangs who threaten the stability and
security of the southwest of Libya (Ibid).
After destroying ISIS militias in Libya, both the GNA and the LNA started to fight each
other over the legitimate control of Libya, so on January 16, 2019, LNA forces marched toward
Tripoli, they managed to take some towns near it, but the GNA with support from some Tripoli
and Misratan militias prevented Haftar’s forces from entering Tripoli, and as of June 2019, the
fighting had killed at least 510 people and displaced 75,000 people (Ibid).
Libya has been struggling for 10 years now with a very complicated and fragmented
internal landscape, notwithstanding, the international efforts to regain peace and bring back the
country to the democratic transition path, managed to seal a peace deal between the GNA and
the LNA on June 16, 2019, that supposed to lead to parliamentary and presidential elections
before the end of 2019, but the situation was again complicated by the lack of consensus on the
political road map and the allocation of ministerial positions (Ibid).
Finally, on October 23rd, 2020, the 5+5 Joint Libyan Military Commission formed earlier
in February 2020, which consisted of 10 senior military officers representing both the LNA
and the GNA, reached a permanent ceasefire agreement in all areas of Libya and called all
foreign fighters to leave Libya within three months and leave the Libyan police forces to take
control of the disputed areas. The agreement paved the way for the formation of an interim
unity government headed by Abdul Hamid Debeibeh, who is a prominent Libyan politician
and businessman, that will lead the country until the anticipated parliamentary elections in
December 2021.
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III. II Applying the Theory of New Wars on Libya (2011-2020)
The following part will focus on the application of Kaldor’s new wars’ features on the
Libyan crisis from 2011 till 2020, this could help us to better understand the Libyan dilemma
which might lead to more sustainable and effective solutions. The main features that we will
discuss are mainly; the existence of identity politics based on tribalism in Libya, the failure of
the Libyan state, the multiplicity of actors involved in the conflict, the targeting of civilians,
and the war economy incentives in Libya since 2011.
a. Location: Intra-state conflict
The whole story of the Libyan conflict that began in February 2011 took place exclusively
on the Libyan soil and within its territories. There were repercussions on the neighboring states
like Egypt, Tunisia, and Chad from a security perspective, but the physical fight and the actual
existence of the militia were in Libya. The revolution on February 17th, 2011 started in the city
of Benghazi in the northeastern part of Libya, then it was expanded to the other Libyan cities
by med-August 2011 (as shown in Figure 5). Thereafter, the ongoing tensions that started in
2014 took place mostly in Benghazi, Tripoli, Sirte, and Misrata (as indicated in Figure 6).
Figure (5): Map of the Libyan conflict as of October 2011
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Source: Rafy - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=17061729
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Figure (6): Map of the tensions in Libya as of December 2014
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b. The Failure of the Libyan State
Libya took the same path as Tunisia and Egypt but it reached a very different end, that is
mainly because both Egypt and Tunisia had mature institutions long before the revolution, as
both of them had strong judiciary, military, and parliament with Tunisia having in addition to
that well-informed and active civil society organizations, besides that the Tunisian and
Egyptian people were united in their discontent with their old regimes and that prevented both
countries from slipping into a prolonged violence an division. Whilst in Libya, there was not
any active or strong state institution and everything was run solely by Al-Gaddafi and his closed
circle, which made internal division profound and left the country as a free space for tribes and
international actors to dictate their rules and agendas.
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Source: Van Linge, T. (December 2014) “The current situation in the Libyan civil war”:
https://imgur.com/kyhcrE0
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The weakness of the state institutions along with Libya’s deeply-rooted tribal divisions
led to what can be described as a “failed state” starting from 2011, that is when the government
couldn’t fully control its territories and its natural resources, which was the door from which
the different local and international actors have entered and imposed their identity politics, and
funded themselves through plunder, smuggling, and illegal trade without any high authority in
the country to hold them accountable and bring discipline to the society. Additionally, from
2014 until 2020, the local tribal councils were replacing the formal governmental bodies in
different Libyan towns and cities, which stripped the transitional government of its monopoly
of the legitimate use of violence and led to the ongoing instability in Libya.
I found Rotberg’s reasoning for states’ failure more relevant to the Libyan case, as he
said that “nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer
deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants” (Rotberg, 2003: 1). Therefore, if we applied
the previous characteristics on Libya in the period from 2011 to 2020, we can divide our
evidence into 3 main parts;
1) The inability to control people or territories
Since the eruption of the Libyan revolution in February 2011, the Libyan government
couldn’t hold full control over the Libyan territories and it relied on militias and tribal guardians
to provide security. The reason for the weakness of the state security apparatus is Al-Gaddafi’s
paranoia about giving a certain faction -even it was his own army- much power that would
allow that faction to challenge him (Engel, 2014: 5). Also, politicians were not trained or
experienced enough to take the lead of the country after Al-Gaddafi. Therefore, all of Libya’s
post-revolutionary security institutions were “fractured along local, tribal, ideological, partisan,
personal, and regional lines” (Winer, 2019: 11).
A very important incident to mention on that matter is when the Interim Defense Minister,
Osama Juawili asked the rebels in Tripoli to keep their weapons instead of asking them to hand
these weapons to the central government, and that was to keep them in charge of securing
Tripoli from attacks by other hostile militias. Statistics showed that more than 200,000 rebels
in Libya are in need of disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation (DDR), which was
almost 11% of the Libyan workforce that was estimated by the time of the survey to be
2.3 million workers (Engel, 2014: 5). Also, most of the formal state institutions were replaced
by tribal councils and militia-made checkpoints.

67 | P a g e

It is worth mentioning that almost all the Libyan transitional governments helped in
augmenting the “militarization” of the country, as they funded certain militias and backed them
to do security jobs on their behalf, they were turning those militias into “semi-state” forces
such as the Supreme Security Council (SSC), the Libya Shield Army, and the Preventive
Security Apparatus, that was a counterintelligence force, as they all were working under the
supervision of the Interior Ministry and the Chief of Staff. However, that strategy has sowed
the seeds of “warlordism” in Libya (Cole & Wehrey, 2013). Furthermore, most of the hardline
revolutionary brigades didn’t trust the Libyan transitional governments, especially the Libyan
officers and armed forces, which complicated the government’s efforts to incorporate all the
militias and regain control of the country.
The Libyan transitional governments didn’t only lose their monopoly of using violence
on the people and militias, but they lost their control over their own institutions such as
mosques. Salafists were taking over mosques from the Libyan Ministry of Islamic Endowments
(Awqaf), the latter confirmed the loss of almost 5,000 mosques to Salafists in July 2012 (Engel,
2014: 5). Notwithstanding, they lost control over borders as well, especially the southern
borders, as the former Libyan Prime Minister, Abdulrahim Al-Keib stated in March 2012 that
“the border regions have witnessed a noticeable escalation of drugs and weapons contraband”
(Ibid). With that being said, extremists and terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS have utilized that security vulnerability to smuggle their weapons
(Ibid).
2) The inability to provide basic services
Most of the Libyan state revenues were being used in what is called a “bribery protection
racket”, which means that the state was transferring its revenues to militias and private actors
instead of investing them in improving public services and infrastructure or in diversifying
their economic resources. Traditional Gaddafi’s heavy subsidy strategy that relies on providing
subsidies to the already well-positioned people didn’t lead to an improvement in state services
or in the economy in general. Moreover, the state corruption and the lack of state monitoring
over its expenditures that Al-Gaddafi has strengthened throughout his rule had a lot to do with
the country’s lost revenues, as many workers were paid and allowed to collect multiple salaries
without actually working, as the former Interior Minister, Ashour Shuawil exposed a major
scandal in March 31, 2013, when he showed that 79,000 out of 120,000 security personnel
were on a payroll but were not reporting for work (Ibid: 6).
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3) The need for international intervention
Despite the claims of some Libyan officials that Libya didn’t turn into a “failed state”,
the HoR voted on August 13, 2013, to allow for foreign intervention that could help the country
from further falling into chaos. Additionally, Abu Bakr Buera, who was a member of the HoR
who has refused to ask for any international intervention at the beginning of the crisis, changed
his position and said that “the international community must intervene immediately to ensure
that civilians are protected” (Ibid: 9). which is according to the international law criteria
mentioned by Ivo Bičanić, Vladimir Gligorov, and Ivan Krastev is completing what is needed
to describe the Libyan state as a “failed state” (Bianic et al., 2003: 11).
c. Actors: The Complexity of the Libyan Actors
Libya since 2011 has been ripped by a complex network of actors, each actor is seeking
his own interests, the government -as mentioned previously- couldn’t provide security or fully
control the Libyan territories, so there was no high authority to unify those actors, or even force
them to submit to the interest of the whole country and not their private objectives. Statistics
in 2014 showed that there were almost 1,600 armed groups operating across Libya, which
increased from 1,300 in 2011 (CGRS, 2014: 7 & ECCHR; FIDH; LFJL, 2021: 16; Rowan,
2019) which reflects the complexity of the situation in Libya and how the dark fragmentiative
legacy of Al-Gaddafi sowed the seeds for such complicated chaos.
We can classify the most prominent actors in the Libyan crisis as follows;
1) Political actors, who were mainly the political elites, who were mostly well-known
traders, government contractors, and technocrats. They enjoyed well financial positions
during Al-Gaddafi regime. Also, Heads of political parties, including political Islamists,
However, the most popular political actors in the Libyan conflict were;
▪ The Justice and Construction Party (JCP).
▪ The Government of National Accord (GNA).
▪ The National Transitional Council (NTC).
▪ The General National Council (GNC).
▪ The Presidential Council (PC).
▪ The House of Representatives (HoR).
▪ The National Forces Alliance (NFA).
▪ Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council.
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2) Security Forces, who were mainly;
▪ Gaddafi’s soldiers, who served in the Libyan National Army before 2011.
▪ The Libyan National Army (LNA).
▪ The Libyan Police.
▪ The Petroleum Guards.
3) Militias, whose numbers were raised due to the continued funding from 30,000 in 2011
to 250,000 in 2014 (Pack et al., 2014: 2), and the most popular militias were;
▪ The 7th Brigade, or Kaniyat.
▪ Tripoli Revolutionaries’ Brigades.
▪ The Nawasi.
▪ The Zintan Revolutionaries’ Miliatry Council.
▪ Misratan Union of Revolutionaries.
▪ 17 February Martyrs Brigade.
▪ The Nasr Brigade.
▪ The Anas Al-Dabbashi Birgade.
▪ The Buni Brigade.
▪ Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade.
▪ Libya Shield 1.
4) Extremists and Terrorist Organizations, who were mainly;
▪ Ansar Al-Sharia.
▪ Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
▪ The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
▪ The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).
5) Foreign actors, who were the states that had interests in the Libyan conflict;
▪ United Arab Emirates (UAE).
▪ Egypt.
▪ The NATO.
▪ USA.
▪ Russia.
▪ Turkey.
▪ Qatar.
▪ Italy.
▪ France.
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6) Gangs and Smugglers, most of them were in the south.
▪ Issma Boys, who were a small gang attacking migrants’ boats and demand bribes.
d. Goals: Libya’s Tribalism as Source for its Fragility
To start with the definition of “Tribalism” or in Arabic “Qabaliya” or “Asabiyya”, we
shall refer to Muhammad Ben Lamma’s definition, as he refers to it as “the methods of social
organization through lineage and through a common ancestry” (Ben Lamma, 2017: 4). With
that in mind, we need also to know that the word “Libya” comes mainly from an old Berber
tribe that was called “Libu”, which gives a glimpse of how the country is extremely concerned
with tribal affiliations and divisions (Gul, 2019).
Therefore, Libya has been a unique North African country when it comes to its
demographic and political settings, as its 680 square miles were historically divided into three
major regions, which are; 1) Cyrenaica in the east, and its capital Benghazi. 2) Tripolitania
in the west, and its capital is Tripoli. 3) Fezzan in the southwest, and its capital is Sabha. These
divisions were formally recognized by the Ottomans, but the Italians unified them under one
“Libya” to easily control their colony.
The Libyan hard terrain that mostly consists of the desert “Sahara” pushed most of its
population, which counts as 6,8 million Libyans (World Bank, 2020), to live on the
Mediterranean coastal line, and left people scattered, which strengthened the already existing
distinctions between different tribes and regions, as each tribe had its own cultural and
economic identity. Hence, it is believed that “currently about 90% of Libya’s entire populace
is connected to a tribe, whereas only 10% are not related organically to any tribe, remarkably
in the cities of northern Libya” (Al-Shadeedi & Ezzeddine, 2019). However, from the
140 tribes that inhabit Libya today, there are significant tribes, and some of them are significant
in what Libya has become today as shown in Figure 7.
Main Ethnicities and Tribes in Libya
Libya is mainly made up of 4 ethnicities, which are; Arabs, Amazighs, Touaregs, and
Tebus. However, the majority of the Libyans are a mixture of Arabs and Berbers. Each ethnicity
is represented in a tribe, so to start with the Arabs tribes, we have the two major Arabs tribes
in Libya that came from the Arabic peninsula, and they are; the Beni Salim tribe who settled
in Cyrenaica in the eastern part of the country, while the second one is the Beni Hilal tribe who
occupied Tripolitania in the west (Ben Lamma, 2017: 11).
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Figure (7): Libya’s Tribal Map
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Unlike the Arabs tribes, Counting and tracking the Amazighs and Touaregs is difficult
because they are scattered and mainly live in the vast Libyan desert and mountains. However,
an initial estimation that was made by Ben Lamma in 2017 shows that they are approximately
200,000 people, and they are mainly living in the mountains of Djebel Nefoussa, and the coastal
town of Zouara (Ibid).
The last major ethnicity in Libya is the Tebus, who are from black origins and live in the
southeast and south of Libya, near the Tibesti mountains, along the Chadian and Nigerian
borders. They are mostly living in Sabha and in the Al-Kufra oasis in the Fezzan region.
Moreover, they consider themselves non-Arabs and they are still demanding special
recognition of their ethnicity in the Libyan constitution (Ibid: 19).

6

Source: : https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/110620_libya.pdf
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To have a better understanding of the tribal system in Libya, it is important to always
remember that “tribes are not considered as collective governed actors in an authoritarian and
hierarchical sense. On the contrary, each tribe is divided into “sub-tribes”, with family lines
and extended families” (Ibid: 17). Hence, in the following part, I am giving a brief about the
major/sub-tribes in Libya to have a good understanding of that complex social system.
Major tribes in the West:
1) The Warfallah tribe, they are the most crucial tribe in Libya because of their vast
numbers and geographical spread. They are almost 1 million people, and they mainly
dominate Tripolitania. They were in alliance with Al-Gaddafi until 2011, then they left
him and backed the Libyan rebellion to remove him from power.
2) The Qadhadfa tribe, they are a small tribe from which Al-Gaddafi came to power,
there are living in the territory stretching from Sirte to Sabha in Fezzan. They gained
importance once Al-Gaddafi came to power, and allied with the Warfallah and the
Magariha tribes along with some Amazigh tribes.
3) The Zinten tribe, they are from the Berber-Arab ethnicity, and they are located in
Zinten, which is in the middle of Djebel Nefoussa to the southwest of the Libyan capital.
They were actively engaged in the fight against Al-Gaddafi in 2011, as they believed
that it was mainly a “Berber-Arab Spring”, but in the post-Gaddafi period, they were in
a conflict with the neighboring tribe of Machachiya regarding financial and tribal
differences (Rachel, 2011).
Major tribes in the East:
1) Al-Abaidat tribe, they are the dominant tribe in the Cyrenaica (eastern Libya), with
15 sub-tribes and connections with many other tribes in the region. They have occupied
almost all senior positions in the security institutions in the region since the Ottoman
era, and even under Al-Gaddafi.
2) Al-Awaqir tribe, they are a complex and multi-ethnic tribe who are living in the South
and West of Benghazi, they held important and ministerial positions under Al-Gaddafi,
but they were not engaged in the post-Gaddafi political arrangements.
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3) The Zuwaya tribe, they are spread across the eastern part of Libya, especially around
exportation installations in the Gulf of Sidra, and in the oasis of Al-Kufra. They are a
free tribe with no hierarchy, or higher authority, however, they are considered to be a
fierce and xenophobic tribe. They depend on the normal pastoral life with a great hold
on the date palm trees in Al-Kufra oasis.
Major tribes in the South:
1) The Awlad Sulaiman tribe, they were a very influential tribe throughout history in the
region of Fezzan in the south, and they took part in the fight against the Ottomans and
the Italians. They were key allies for Al-Gaddafi.
2) The Magariha tribe, they were very important during Al-Gaddafi era, as they were
historically marginalized until he brought them from Brak Al-Shati to hold security
services positions to counter-balance the influence of the other tribes. In return, they
benefited materially from him, so they were very loyal to his rule.
Since Libya’s independence in 1951, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania were in constant tensions
and conflicts over the ruling of the country. Cyrenaica with its capital, Benghazi was Libya’s
political capital from 1951 till 1969 when King Idris I ruled the country after its independence.
However, things changed when Al-Gaddafi took the power from King Idris in his coup d’état
in 1969, as he was from Sirte in Tripolitania, which shifted the country’s power from the east
to the west until today. While Fezzan and southern Libya remained on the periphery of the
political arrangements but every party in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania was trying to get that part
on his side to gain more power and get access to Libya’s most fragile borders for illegal trade
and smuggling.
Tribalism has always been a key element in understanding the social and political settings
of Libya because as Ben Lamma indicates, loyal tribes can be “an instrument of power for the
tight and rigorous control of society and the geographical cohesion of areas where tribal sheiks
were present. Such leaders, in the name of centralized power, took on the fight against the
diverse opposition forces on their own territories” (Ben Lamma, 2017: 6). Notwithstanding,
Al-Gaddafi promised to eradicate the tribal affiliations in Libya and build a unified Libyan
identity, which was clearly stated in his “Green Book” or the 1975 constitution.
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On the contrary, Al-Gaddafi was the main reason behind solidifying tribal divisions in
Libya since he took power in 1969 because as Richard Baxley has said that Al-Gaddafi
“comprehended that using tribal allegiances was his best hope for staying in office” (Baxley,
2011). Therefore, he focused on avoiding any provocation to the major tribes, and he sought to
build alliances with them, so he began with the major 4 tribes; the Gaddadfa in the center, the
Warfalla in the west, Magarha in the south, and Awaqir in the east. Al-Gaddafi then
strengthened these alliances through family blood through marriage, he married the daughter
of a top-ranked officer from Magarha in 1969, then he married Safia Farkash of the Baras tribe
from Cyrenaica in 1970 (Chuprygin et al., 2019: 168-169).
Moreover, Richard Baxley states that Al-Gaddafi “tiled his hold on influence by settling
rival tribes counter to one another, gratifying those faithful to him with political arrangements
and punishing those that contrasted him” (Baxley, 2011). Hence, he adopted a “violent
fragmentary logic” as he intended to utilize the country’s tribal differences to build political
support for his rule, so he reinforced the tribes’ loyalty to him through an expensive patronage
system, and he gave preferential treatment to the western tribes that are namely; his own tribe
Gadhadhfa, the Magarha, and Warfalla, that besides his close friends from the Free Officers
Movement who helped him in his coup d’état in 1969, and his family. That preferential
treatment that Al-Gaddafi has used to ensure those tribes’ loyalty included parts of the public
sector funds, good employment opportunities, and other material gifts (Vira & Cordesman,
2011: 66). That strategy helped him to stay in power for 42 years (Ben Lamma, 2017: 6).
However, when his popularity was deteriorating, he feared losing power, so he decided to
bring religion to the field to be above any tribal pride or clan devotion. Hence, he sought help
from Sufi Senussi brotherhoods and built “zawiyas” for each town or tribe (Sayigh, 2016: 8),
which were famous buildings associated with Sufis, and they could serve a variety of functions
such a place of worship, school, monastery and/or mausoleum (Kane, 1995). Putting religion
in the political equation gave those tribes a sense of equality and unity, but it was temporary as
the fight among the Libyan clans was revived along with the Libyan revolution in 2011, as
each party or actor tried to utilize tribal loyalty to mobilize supporters.
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The Libyan revolution in 2011 took place in the eastern marginalized side of Libya,
Benghazi, and by analyzing the situation then, we can say that “youngsters were mobilized
through tribal systems, and the instantaneous help of eastern tribes who didn’t help the regime
early on in the uprising permitted the rebels to free Cyrenaica first with ease” (Al-Shadeedi &
Ezzeddine, 2019). On the western side of the country, Sirte which was the birthplace of AlGaddafi, had around 70,000 members of his clan and close friends, in addition to Sirte, the
Tawergha tribe, and the Mashashya tribe who were also in the west fighting on Al-Gaddafi
side which has crippled the eastern forces advance to the west (Vira & Cordesman, 2011: 66).
However, it is important to quote Ben Lamma when he mentioned that “Libyan tribalism
is flexible and that allegiances fluctuate according to pragmatism as a response to the
circumstances and perceived opportunities” (Ben Lamma, 2017: 21), so even tribal alliances
between Al-Gaddafi’s Gadhadhfa tribe and the Warfallas broke down because of the growing
public discontent with Al-Gaddafi’s brutal hold to power.
Understanding the tribal mapping of Libya is crucial to analyzing the repercussions and
the consequences of the Libyan Spring because today we might hear that Amazigh for instance
is calling for political recognition and official acknowledgment of their culture, as they claim
that they were marginalized and unfairly treated by Al-Gaddafi for 42 years (Ibid: 11). Also,
the linkages between tribes in the country went across its borders to countries like Egypt and
Tunisia, Ben Lamma describes that “Such ties are also made up of solidarities, marriages,
economic exchanges, migration and even downturns” (Ibid: 5). So, having tribes or Bedouins
who originally came from Libya in these two neighboring countries made it a matter of national
security for them to be involved in one way or another in the Libyan crisis.
Another advantage of getting the tribal system of a country right is the tribes’ crucial part
in conflicts resolution as “social mediators”, as it is believed that “the advantages of calling
upon the informal institution of the tribe and its justice system are that the latter is more
accessible, faster, more transparent and less corrupt than those of state tribunals” (Ibid: 7).
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e. Finance: Militias looting Libya’s wealth by the war economy methods
It is money, time, and physically exhausting for any armed group to keep fighting for a
long time without securing enough funds to keep recharging their power and pursuing their
agendas. In Libya, the formal economy was already in disarray, the patronage system that once
was built to save the country from intertribal conflicts and ensure the supremacy of Al-Gaddafi
was taking the country’s wealth from the places which were truly in need of it and giving it to
the already well-positioned people, then after Gaddafi the wealth was shifted to the militias
who were helping in bringing stability to the state.
Furthermore, the corrupted state institutions were already working without any
accountability or transparency, which helped in solidifying Libya’s war economy that was
relying on smuggling, illegal trade, plundering, and human trafficking. It is important to
understand the term “war economy” first to know how and why it affected the continuation of
the Libyan crisis. Tim Eaton provided a simple definition that defines “war economy” as the
economy that “encompasses economic activities dependent -directly or indirectly- on the
dispensation or perpetuation of violence” (Eaton, 2018: 5).
The war economy was highly damaging for Libya and its future because;
1) It offered a suitable environment for armed groups, criminals, and corrupt elites to keep
their illegal and predatory activities because this was dependent on the continued
violence and chaos.
2) It encouraged those who were profiting from the state’s dysfunction to reject any
attempt for a reform or a state-building, as they didn’t want any authority to track their
illicit predatory practices.
3) It allowed armed groups and criminals to control the smuggling routes, oil terminals,
border posts, and key import and export nodes (Ibid: 2,6).
Libya’s war economy was tangible in the southern and western parts, as without a formal
security existence from the state these parts turned into markets for illicit trade and smuggling,
and even in the capital Tripoli, the militias, who were called by the GNA and before it the
GNC, along with the political elites were trying to extract as much of the state revenues as
possible. However, the eastern part of the country was not easy for war economy profiteers,
because General Haftar established a form of military rule that has put many restrictions on
illegal trade, human, and fuel smuggling (Ibid: 6).
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The blurred line between state and non-state actors complicates the situation, as even
groups who are affiliated with official state institutions were profiting from the incentives of
the war economy. Building on that, Eaton has said that “the system of incentives within the
war economy has become a cause of its persistence, frustrating the reassertion of state authority
at a local and national level” (Ibid). Since the fall of Al-Gaddafi regime, open and vicious
competition has started among the different actors of the Libyan crisis over the country’s
dynamic illicit marketplace.
Smugglers who used to cross the Libyan Sahara to smuggle illicit goods in the pre-2011
period have escalated their illegal practices to smuggle weapons, drugs, fuel, counterfeit
cigarettes, and people, while routes close to the Libyan borders were mainly used to smuggle
subsidized goods like fuel, rice, and other types of food which were considered as the main
source of income for many groups and tribes in these parts of the country. After 2011,
smugglers’ work was being threatened by groups who want to have shares in these operations,
so they relied on the protection of certain armed groups to get their work done, and they were
paying those militias for their protection service (Ibid: 8).
The most known war economy forms in Libya were 1) smuggling, mainly people and
fuel. 2) extortion and rent-seeking. In the following part, I am explaining how each form was
developed across Libya in the post-2011 period, and how this helped in prolonging the Libyan
chaos.
1) Smuggling
Smugglers in Libya took advantage of both; its strategic location on the Mediterranean
Sea which is so close to the European shores to smuggle people (human trafficking) to Europe,
and they utilized the ongoing instability and lack of state monitoring to smuggle subsidized
fuel and sometimes food to the neighboring state such as Tunisia. Eaton has mentioned that
since 2013 and the numbers of migrants from Libya to Europe have dramatically increased to
a very high level in decades, from 15,000 in 2012 to 163,000 in 2016 (Ibid: 9). Then, by 2016,
Libya has become the main “launching point for mixed migration” to Europe (Ibid).
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The revenues from smuggling people in Libya reached $978 million in 2016 which was
equivalent to %3.4 of Libya’s 2015 GDP which was $29.1 billion (Ibid: 10). That shows why
many groups were interested in taking part in the human smuggling activities, especially those
who had limited alternative income resources as those in the southern parts of the country, and
those groups developed complex networks with different tribes and militias to ensure that their
operations go smoothly and without troubles. Even the Libyan coastguards were indirectly
involved in allowing smugglers to send people to Europe on boats but after paying the guards
(Ibid: 11).
Fuel smuggling has led the country to increase its imports of refined oil products, which
increased the costs that the country has endured in these critical times to reach around $5 billion
in January 2017 according to the figures reported by the UN Panel of Experts interim report in
2018, however, the Libyan Attorney General announced to the press that time that the
smuggling of the Libyan subsidized fuel had cost the country around $3.6 billion (Ibid: 14).
Moreover, the state lost around %85 of the projected income from taxes on domestically
distributed refined fuel products, and the Libyan Audit Bureau estimated the state loss to be
around $1.8 billion per annum mainly from 2012 till 2017, this should be understood away
from the amount of illicit revenues received by the smugglers’ (Ibid). According to Eaton, fuel
smuggling in Libya was taking three forms; 1) cross-border overland smuggling of small
volumes of fuel. 2) the diversion of fuel supplies within the state. 3) maritime smuggling of
much larger quantities of diesel (Ibid).
Additionally, fuel was diverted from refineries, ports, and warehouses to unknown
destinations, also the deeply-rooted corruption in the state oil institutions was manifested in a
large number of petrol stations existing only on papers, as the National Oil Corporation (NOC)
has spotted 87 out of 105 in 2017 that were non-operational (Ibid: 15).
It is worth mentioning that other forms of smuggling such as smuggling weapons and
drugs existed in Libya since the fall of Al-Gaddafi in 2011, as the country was considered a
transit zone for weaponry, hashish, heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamines, however, their
scale was less than human and fuel smuggling during that period, and recent efforts by the LNA
and other Libyan officials to disturb smuggling routes and curb these illicit practices have
resulted in a huge decrease in most of these illegal activities.
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2) Extortion and Rent Seeking
Another key source of income for the militias and warlords in Libya is their ability to
control -by force- important export and import nodes alongside oil and gas infrastructure and
then generate revenue through extortion or rents. The most well-known forms of extortion and
rent-seeking in Libya by far were; kidnapping for ransom, oil blockades, providing facilitation
services and threatening key civilian infrastructures like airports and ports. Statistics showed
that in 2017, around 676 individuals were kidnapped, and only 100 of them returned to their
homes. In most cases, the kidnap was motivated by the profit behind it (the ransom) and
targeted everyone regardless the ethnic, political, or tribal affiliations (Ibid: 20).
Building on that, militias have cost the state huge losses due to their ability to block
Libya’s key infrastructures like the oil terminals in the “oil crescent”, which is a region that
extends along the Libyan coast from Sirte to Ras Lanuf and to the Jufra in the south, as the
Central Bank of Libya (CBL) estimated the total losses for militias blockades in August 2017
to be $160 billion (Ibid: 22). Furthermore, in October 2017, a militia led by Khalifa Ahnish
took over the huge Libyan irrigation network of the Great Man-Made River that was supplying
water to Tripoli, which shows how powerful were the militias in the absence of the state and
its monopoly of using violence and force from 2011 till 2020.
f. The international intervention in Libya
Libya was not only a battlefield for local tribes and their affiliated militias with the
remnants of the state’s forces, but also it was an open battlefield for international actors who
are having interests in the conflict, those actors have complicated the situation and posed new
challenges for any attempt to settle the conflict and reach a permanent peace in Libya. The
blame can only be on the fragmentative legacy of Al-Gaddafi that made the state very weak
and stripped it from its legitimate monopoly of violence, which made it easy for those
international actors to rush for help, but not to help the Libyan people, instead, they feared
jeopardizing their interests in one of the key North African countries.
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Although the European countries like the UK, France, Italy along with the US have pushed
for the NATO air mission in Libya to halt Al-Gaddafi’s crackdown on the opposition in 2011,
and they managed in destroying his regime by the end of their operations, their humanitarian
and financial aid were not successful as their airstrikes. The only beneficiaries were the private
sector who according to Johnathan Winer could “exploit the contracting opportunities which
first blossomed amid an orgy of Libyan spending, and then quickly withered” (Winer, 2019:
10).
On the contrary, regional actors such as Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, the
United Arab Emirates, and later on Russia were heavily active in the conflict, as each one of
them backed a certain faction in the conflict. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE were backing
the LNA led by General Haftar who is mainly based in Tobruk. On the other side, Qatar and
Turkey supported the Islamists who were mainly operating in Tripoli through Sudan. It was
because of the conflicting interests of the international actors that in 2014 Libya was split into
two parts, then Algeria and Morocco joined the crisis to mediate between the two competing
factions and the major result was the Sokhairat Agreement in 2015.

III. III Conclusion
Libya was and still is considered a key North African country, any development in the
country could affect the settings of the whole MENA region, as it’s very deeply connected
either formally or informally with other neighboring countries like Egypt, and Tunisia. Also, it
has a valuable meaning for old colonizers such as Turkey and Italy. However, the 2011
revolution was an unprecedented incident that was never seen in the history of the country, as
it didn’t only change one of the longest-ruling regimes in the region, but it also uncovered new
facts and information that not everyone was familiar with before.
In this chapter, we tried to apply Kaldor’s new wars’ features to the Libyan case from
2011 to 2020 to see how it would help us to better understand the complexity of the conflict
that might lead policy-makers to develop more efficient methods to reach sustainable peace
and stability in the country. The result of that application was that all new wars’ features were
applicable to the Libyan case as shown in Table 4.
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Table (3): New Wars Features in Libya from 2011 till 2020

New Wars Features in Libya from 2011-2020
Intra-State Conflict

√

Failed State

√

Multiple Active State and Non-State

√

Actors
Identity-Based Conflict

√

Population Displacement

-

War Economy Incentives

√

International Intervention

√

After that examination of the Libyan crisis, we can say that the revolution didn’t break
out because of the oil curse as some scholars believed, or because of intertribal tensions, but it
started from socio-economic grievances that were augmented by Al-Gaddafi’s discrimination
and unjust rule, then there were some supporting factors for the continuation of the conflict
such as the collapse of the state’s weak institutions, tribalism, and war economy incentives.
In the last chapter, we will recommend according to Kaldor’s cosmopolitan peacebuilding
proposal how policy-makers can build on it to reach more sustainable solutions for the Libyan
dilemma, but for the coming chapter, it is important to take another similar case which is the
Yemeni crisis from 2011 till 2020 to see whether the theory of new wars is applicable there
also or the Libyan case was unique than other post-Arab Spring cases.
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CHAPTER IV:
ASSESSING NEW WARS THEORY IN
YEMEN (2011-2020)
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CHAPTER IV: ASSESSING NEW WARS THEORY IN YEMEN
(2011-2020)

Chapter IV is mainly devoted to analyzing the case of Yemen from 2011 when
popular protests took the streets against the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh, then I am
ending my focus timeline with 2020 because of the lack of recent comprehensive
related studies.
I am applying Kaldor’s features of new wars on the country to see how the theory
of New Wars would ever lead to a different understanding and analysis of the
ongoing vicious conflicts in the country or it would add no value to the ongoing
literature and policies concerned with these cases. So, I am starting by showing
the historical development of the Yemeni case and how we have reached the recent
situation, then I am taking each feature of new wars and applying it to the country.
Therefore, I am testing whether such conflicts can be described as New Wars in
Kaldor’s terms or not.
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Figure (8): Map of Yemen
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Source: Worldometers: https://www.worldometers.info/maps/yemen-political-map/
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IV. I Introduction
Yemen has been known as the “happy land” or the “Arabia Felix”, its high mountains
were attracting rain most of the time throughout the year, so it has the most fertile land in the
Arabian Peninsula (FAO). The country of 527,970 square kilometers is located at the entrance
to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which links the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean through the Gulf of
Aden, and it has one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. It borders Saudi Arabia to the
north and Oman to the northeast. Through the Socotra island, Yemen also shares borders with
the Guardafui Channel and the Somali Sea.
The strategic location of the country was always a target for colonizers, as it controls the
tap of the Red Sea, it has the closest access to Sub-Saharan Africa in the Gulf region. That
unique location was a clear target for colonizers like the Ottomans and the British empires.
Once Islam entered the country around 630 A.D, the country was controlled by different sheiks
and Muslim tribes until the Zaydis -who are part of the Islamic Shi’a doctrine- controlled
Yemen with Imam Yahya bin Al-Mansur Bi'llah Ahmad taking the leadership of North Yemen
after the Ottoman empire was dissolved in 1918.
Imam Yahya’s long rule created a wide range of opposition to his monopoly of power,
then in 1948 he was assassinated in a coup attempt, and his son, Ahmed bin Yahya Hamidaddin
took the power after his father, but his rule was not as long as his father, so in 1962 he died and
left the country with a huge popular discontent and with British colonization of the south,
Ahmed’s son inherited the leadership from his father but was removed one week later by army
officers, led by Colonel Abdallah Al-Sallal, who took control of Sanaa in the south and created
Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). Afterward, the officers created the Revolutionary Command
Council headed by Al-Sallal.
The history of the “happy land” is not happy at all, civil wars erupted between different
frictions of the Yemeni society, it started with a civil war between supporters of the republic
and its opposition in 1962, then it was followed by other conflicts until the waves of the Arab
Spring in 2011 turned the country into the “worst humanitarian crisis in the world” according
to the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), as by March 2018, 22 million Yemeni
which represents almost 75% of the population then needed humanitarian aid, and also the
country was on the brink of famine, an outbreak of cholera and other diseases, which could end
up with a total failure because of the ongoing divisions and fights (UNSC, 2018).
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The following part sheds the flight briefly on the history of Yemen until we reached the ongoing
crisis in the country in the post-Arab Spring era.

IV. II Background on Yemen (1962-2020)
The emergence of the Yemen Arab Republic (1962-1978)
Yemen started to fall into a vicious circle of violence after army officers led by Abdullah
as-Sallal took the leadership from the grandson of Imam Yahya, Muhammad al-Badr on
September 26, 1962, and they announced that the “Mutawakkilite” kingdom of Yemen
(northern Yemen) would be the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), as those who were supporting
the new republic backed by Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and covertly the UK clashed with
those who were supporting the Zaidi Imamate. The clashes escalated very quickly into a largescale civil war that lasted until 1970 with the victory of the republicans and the official
inauguration of the YAR in the north (Salisbury, 2016: 7 & Brecher; Wilkenfeld, 1997: 324325).
Figure (9): North and South Yemen Pre-1990
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Source: Wiki Commons: https://ar.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81:Divided_Yemen.svg
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During the civil war, the British soldiers withdrew from south Yemen in 1967, and then
the leftists established the People's Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in southern Yemen. Thereafter,
the northern YAR clashed on borders with the PDRY in 1972. Both sides supported
insurgencies in order to weaken each other to have full leverage on the whole Yemeni
territories, even within the two sides there were divisions. However, the Arab League brokered
a ceasefire between the two sides in the same year (Salisbury, 2016: 7 & Montgomery, 2021).

Yemen under Ali Abdallah Saleh (1978-2011)
In the north, Ali Abdullah Saleh became the president of northern Yemen in 1978 with
the support of his Sanhan tribe, then another cycle of violence took place in 1979 between the
north and the south, soon in 1986, another brutal civil war took place in the south civil war in
during which thousands died, sparked by an attempt by then PDRY president Ali Nasser
Mohammed to purge hard-left rivals from the southern state’s leadership, resulted in the Nasser
Mohammed faction fleeing north. Many displaced southern military officers, among them Abd
Rabbu Mansour Hadi (Yemen’s current president), joined the northern military (Ibid).
Many attempts were made by different regional and local figures to unite the north and
the south, and in May 1990 Ali Abdullah Saleh and Ali Salem al-Beidh, then secretary-general
of the southern ruling Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) declared the unification of Yemen, and at
the same time, the Zaidi-Shia group Ansar Allah—or the Houthis—were gradually gaining
power with indirect support from Saleh (Ibid).
The unification should have been the end of a dark and divided era for the Yemenis,
however, the relations between the north and the south went worse than before the unification,
as the southerners felt marginalized and excluded from the decision-making by the northerners,
and that was clear when northern parties won the majority of seats in the 1993 parliamentary
elections, which inflamed the hatred between the south and the north once again. Thereafter, a
new civil war broke out in 1994 between the north and the south, then it was ended with the
victory of Saleh and his northern allies (Ibid: 7-8).
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Ali Abdullah Saleh has shielded himself by a strong coalition with the Islah network that
was supported by tribal militias loyal to Al-Ahmar tribe and sheiks of the Hashid, which was
Yemen’s most powerful tribal confederation, and the Republican Guard, who were until
Saleh’s last decade the best-equipped and best-trained part of the national army, however,
during the 1994 civil war, the First Armoured Division or (Firqa), a military unit overseen by
the conservative Sunni Islamist and Saleh’s Sanhan clansman Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar was the
most powerful military unit in the military (Salisbury, 2016: 8 & Montgomery, 2021).
In order to ensure loyalty in the military, Saleh recruited all Personnel in the country’s
most important military, police, and paramilitary units from the north and he made it difficult
for other groups to revolt against him, as whenever any group tries to attack his regime, he
would withdraw all military units from the areas that were previously protected by him which
would lead to unprecedented instability. Notwithstanding, Saleh and his partners in the Islah
network could not monopoly the use of violence across the whole country, as, since 2000, many
clashes have erupted between those groups who felt marginalized or excluded by Saleh’s
regime and Saleh’s loyalists (Ibid).
Houthis were not on Saleh’s side at the beginning, so in 2004 a vicious campaign was
launched by Saleh’s regime to arrest members of the Houthi group, that campaign was ended
by the arrest of Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, then it was relaunched again in March 2005 to
arrest the successor of Badreddin, who is Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and this time the fight was
brutal as hundreds died during the battles between Saleh’s forces and the Houthis in what was
called the “Sa’dah Wars” that lasted a series of six short wars until 2010, then it took another
shape after the revolution in 2011 (Ibid: 11).
The Houthis were not the only challenge to Saleh in his first ruling decade, as he was
challenged by strong political opposition in the 2006 presidential race led by the Islah-led Joint
Meeting Parties (JMP), who was a coalition of opposition parliamentary groups who relied on
the popular discontent because of the frustration felt by the young educated middle class along
with the poor class in rural Yemen (Ibid: 9). However, Saleh was not done yet with the Houthis,
as the fight continued in 2007 and reached its peak in February 2010 after the success of Saleh’s
Operation Scorched Earth (Amaliat Al'ard Almahruqa) that forced the Houthis out of their
stronghold, Saada governorate and made Abdul-Malik al-Houthi surrender and sign a ceasefire
agreement with Saleh (Ibid & Montgomery, 2021).
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Yemen was very divided under Saleh’s rule, from the Houthis rebellion in the north to the
south peaceful attempts by Hirak al-Janoubi (Southern Movement) best known in Yemen as
Hirak to separate marginalized tribes in crucial Yemeni provinces such as the hydrocarbonrich provinces of Mareb and Hadramawt who were continuously complaining that they were
not receiving the profits of the oil produced in their provinces as that was a major funding
source for Saleh’s patronage system and it reached unprecedented levels in 2009 when exports
of liquified gas from Mareb hiked to very high levels (Salisbury, 2016: 8). Terrorism also was
growing under Saleh’s rule because Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that was an
affiliate of the Afghanistan major terrorist group. Al-Qaeda were gaining ground in the south
and they were mainly targeting the American military existence in the country such as the US
embassy and the American bases in the south (Salisbury, 2016: 9 & Montgomery, 2021).
Saleh was considered a "necessary evil" as his rule was able to maintain the
counterterrorism efforts in the region, especially against the AQAP. However, the western
powers knew that Saleh was an "unreliable autocrat" who used their support and funds to
enhance his patronage system. Then, when Yemenis smelled the Arab Spring breeze on January
2011, Islah found it a golden opportunity to break from Saleh’s alliance and take the side of
the demonstrators on the streets who were calling for comprehensive economic and social
reforms, then they were calling him to step down and put the country back on the democracy
path. So, western powers found it unrealistic to keep supporting the falling regime of Saleh and
shifted their attention toward another ally who will be Abd Rabou Mansor Hadi, that led to an
open battle between militias loyal to Saleh against those who were part of Islah’s network
(Ibid).
It was Saleh’s plan for coup-proofing to create separate security organizations like the
Central Security Forces and National Security Bureau, that was along with his reliance on the
external support from western powers in exchange for his crackdown on AQAP and the
Houthis (Ibid: 8). However, the Yemenis voices were out loud and more powerful than Saleh’s
political and military shields, they have taken the streets to call for greater democratic
freedoms, an end to corruption and poverty, but when the regime was not listening to these
initial demands and instead Saleh launched the offensive Operation Blow to the Head, they
called for the resignation of Saleh, the one who ruled the country for 33 years and witnessed
divisions that led the country to the brink of failure (Ibid & Montgomery, 2021).
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The Yemeni Spring (2011-2015)
In January 2011, Yemeni protestors demonstrated on the streets demanding democratic
reforms, then they demanded from Saleh to step down and hold new free and democratic
elections, however, Saleh and his military responded violently which left hundreds of people
between injured and dead. Saleh’s regional partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
had to respond quickly before their regional rival Iran and the terrorist groups fill in the power
vacuum that would result after the fall of Saleh’s regime, therefore, in April 2011, the GCC
brokered a deal with Saleh’s dominated General People’s Congress (GPC) to hand over the
power which was not welcomed by Hashid tribe and their allies who eventually joined the
opposition against Saleh (Montgomery, 2021).
The fight between Saleh’s forces and the opposition was vicious to the extent that Saleh
himself was seriously injured in a bombing in June 2011 and traveled to Saudi Arabia to receive
urgent treatment. The injury of Saleh paved the way for the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, Jamal
Benomar to reach a final power transfer deal with Saleh and the Islah network who realized
that there will be no decisive victory in that power battle, so the deal brought Saleh’s deputy,
Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi to power in November 2011 (Ibid & Salisbury, 2016: 8).
In February 2012, Hadi was officially elected as the new Yemeni president, yet the
imminent threat of AQAP was growing and their attacks along with the Houthis’ were keeping
Hadi’s new government busy all the time in fighting back rather than putting the state back on
the democratic track. Notwithstanding, the year 2014 was full of political changes, because in
January, The National Dialogue Conference (NDC) drafted the basic document for the new
Yemeni constitution, and in February, a new political transition plan was approved by a
presidential committee that divides the country into a federation of six regions. However,
Hadi’s government was dissolved in August after Yemenis protested against a huge rise in fuel
prices, which allowed the Houthis to regain their position and take over Sanaa in September
2014 (Ibid).
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The Saudi-led Coalition Intervention in Yemen (2015-2020)
After the Houthis took over Sanaa, Hadi was put under house arrest and all efforts to seal
a power-sharing deal failed, so he resigned in January 2015. Hadi then escaped to Aden and
announced that the Houthis’ control over Sanaa is a “coup” and that he would still be the
legitimate president of Yemen. The Arab states led by Saudi Arabia saw that leaving Hadi
struggling alone would cost the whole region a lot, as the Houthis are not by any means a
reliable regional partner, and they would allow Iran to gain more influence in the whole region.
Therefore, Saudi Arabia created a coalition with the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco,
Jordan, Bahrain, Sudan, and Kuwait in March 2015 to launch a military campaign under the
name of Operation Decisive Storm to bring stability and legitimacy back to Yemen (Salisbury,
2016: & Montgomery, 2021).
It was unclear whether the operation succeeded or not, as Saudi Arabia announced in April
2015 that the coalition has ended his initial offensive operation and they would move on to
“Operation Restoring Hope”, however, this time the United States was a bit more involved
through increasing its arms sales to the coalition. In May 2015, a huge twist in the Yemeni
story took place when the ousted president Saleh allied with the Houthis to fight against the
Saudi-led coalition and the AQAP (Montgomery, 2021).
In September 2015, President Hadi returned to Aden after militias loyal to him recaptured
the city from the Houthis, then from that time until December 2017 the fighting between Saleh
with the Houthis on one side and the Saudi-led coalition and the AQAP on the other side
intensified and in many times weaponized drones and missiles were reaching the Saudi soil
and even reaching the capital, Riyadh. However, the whole situation took a dramatic shift when
Saleh decided to take the Saudi-led coalition side and turn against his former temporary allies,
the Houthis, as the battles between Saleh’s loyal militias and the Houthis became brutal to the
extent that Saleh himself was killed in one of them in December 2017 (Ibid).
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The deeply-rooted tensions between the northern and southern Yemen were amplified
after the Houthis took over most of the north, while Hadi and his tribal allies dominated the
south. Moreover, in January 2018, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) which was a
southern separatist movement backed by the United Arab Emirates, sized the port city of Aden
where Hadi’s government was based. On the other side, the Saudi-led coalition has intensified
its air raids and bombing on different parts of Yemen killing one of the most senior Houthi
leaders, Saleh Ali al-Sammad who was the president of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council
(Ibid).
In July 2018, the coalition launched a campaign to regain the port city of Hodeida from
the Houthis, but there were lots of questions the coalition by the international community about
the civilian casualties of their strikes which were extremely high and led the American
administration to reconsider its support to the coalition as the future Secretary of State Antony
Blinken along with the future UN Ambassador nominee Linda Thomas-Greenfield, and the
future National Security Advisor to President Joe Biden Jake Sullivan signed an open letter
expressing remorse for their support for the war and urging all sides to end the fighting.
Surprisingly in December 2018, the US Senate, for the first time, voted to invoke the War
Powers Resolution to force the US military to end its participation in the Yemen war
(Montgomery, 2021).
In the north, the Houthis launched “Operation Victory from God” in the north against the
Saudi-led coalition and they have used weaponized drones to attack the oil processing facilities
in Abqaiq and Khurais in eastern Saudi Arabia which has costed the Saudis half of their oil
output. Following the US, the UAE decided unilaterally to withdraw its forces from south
Yemen in June 2019 but kept its support for the STC and continued its airstrikes with Saudi
Arabia. By September 2019, the STC took over Aden, Abyan, and Shabwa with the Emirati air
coverage (Ibid).
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By March 2020, the Houthis have claimed their full control over more cities including the
strategic city of Al-Hazm in Al-Jawf governorate and the Suadi-led coalition forces launched
a retaliation campaign on Sanaa. Meanwhile, the UN has urged all sides in the Yemeni crisis
to hold their fire to mitigate the huge negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic as the first
COVID case was diagnosed in Yemen in May 2020. Last but not least, the STC and the Hadi
government-managed eventually in signing a new power-sharing agreement in Aden and they
have reappointed Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed as the Yemeni Prime Minister and the government
returned to Aden coming from Saudi Arabi, however, they were welcomed by missiles fired at
the airport by the Houthis but with no casualties among the cabinet members. Therefore, the
Saudi-led coalition intensified its strikes on Sanaa in retaliation for that attack (Ibid).

IV. II

New Wars Theory in Yemen

Applying Kaldor’s new wars theory to the Yemeni crisis from 2011 to 2020 will help us
to understand the complex dynamics of the ongoing conflict there. The long history of divisions
in Yemen made the current situation one of the worst humanitarian crisis in modern history.
Most peacebuilding attempts including the remarkable Stockholm Agreement in 2018 failed to
withhold conditions on all sides of the conflict, so it is better to identify the key dynamics of
the dilemma in order to form better policies that would at least ease the tensions. In the
following part, I am applying the features of the theory of new wars to the Yemeni crisis and I
am ending this part with a summary and suggestions for the way forward.
a. Location: Intra-state conflict
The recent Yemeni crisis started with thousands of Yemenis protesting in the capital Sanaa
in mid-January 2011 calling for political reforms, they were calling for an immediate end to
the government corruption, youth unemployment, and the poor performance of the Yemeni
economy (Orkaby, 2019). On the 20th of January 2011, people in Aden went to the streets to
support the calls for reforms, and the people in Ta’iz joined these protests (Ghobari; Sudam,
2011), after that streets across the whole country witnessed similar protests and their demands
escalated from doing political and economic reforms to ending Saleh’s rule. Afterward, Saleh’s
loyal militias went back and forth in violent battles with the Houthis in the north and the AQAP
in the south until the death of Saleh in December 2017.
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Figure (10): Scale of Conflict in Yemen by October 23, 2011
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Yemen failed political transition that incited the ongoing instability in the region started
and continued as intra-state conflicts between the major Yemeni parties (Saleh’s loyal militias,
Hadi’s soldiers, the Houthis, and the AQAP) within the territories of Yemen. That was until
March 2015 when Saudi Arabia formed the Decisive Storm Coalition to take down the Houthis
and bring stability to the political transition in Yemen. The war then became mainly between
Saudi Arabia and the Houthis which meant a dramatic change in the dynamics of the war in
Yemen. However, according to the previously mentioned criteria of the conflicts, a war
between a state and a non-state organization within the territories of a certain state can still be
considered an intra-state war.

9

Source: Orkaby, A. (2019) ‘Yemen: A Civil War Centuries in the Making’. Origins: Current Events in Historical
Perspective. The Ohio State University. Available at: https://origins.osu.edu/article/yemen-civil-war-houthihumanitarian-crisis-arabia-zaydi?language_content_entity=en
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Figure (11): Maps of Yemen’s Factions Territorial Control April 2015 & October 2020
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Source: Political Geography Now ‘Yemen Control Map & Report’. Available at:
https://www.polgeonow.com/2020/10/yemen-who-controls-what-2020-map.html
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b. Yemen as a Fragile State
A failed state can be a state that “collapses or risks collapsing after the withdrawal of its
super-Power support” or it might be a state that is “unable to govern itself”, but in order to
understand how a state governs itself in basic terms, we can refer to what any state according
to Rotberg should do is to provide that “political good of security to prevent cross-border
invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks
upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to
domestic human security” (Rotberg, 2003: 3). However, failed states are commonly known as
states that are torn by internal ethnic or tribal divisions, so Yemen proved to be the real ongoing
example of the absence of the state’s ability to provide the political good of security. Also, the
failed state concept is frequently used as shorthand for states that are perceived as international
security threats due to internal conflict (Clausen, 2019: 3) as they provide ‘breeding grounds
for terrorism’ (Ibid) which could be evident in Yemen with the rise of the AQAP in the south.
It was until its 9th that the index was testing “failed” states, while in the 10th edition in
2014, it was reframed into a new term that is “fragile” state reflects a small possibility for
improvements and corrections, and it is less “loaded” and “patronizing” than the term “failed”.
Hence, according to the 2019 Fragile States Index, Yemen was ranked as the closest state to be
“the most fragile state in the world” with a score of 113 out of 120, where the 0 refers to the
least fragile state and the 120 shows the most fragile state (FSI, 2019).
Governance is very weak in Yemen as the World Bank ranked it in 2018 as “extremely
low”, besides that Yemen has very high corruption rates by regional standards it is ranked the
178th out of 198 countries in 2020 (Trading Economics). In 2016, Yemen was mentioned in
two-thirds of discussions of the United Nations Security Council as a failed state (Clausen,
2019: 6), it was also notable that the discussions of the UNSC on Yemen were talking about
the “security vacuum” that was caused by the deterioration of the political transition after the
Houthis’ took over the capital in 2015 (Ibid). Building on that, and by using the same criteria
that were used previously in testing the Libyan case on the Yemeni case to see how fragile is
the state there, so we can notice the following;
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1) The inability to control people or territories
The Yemeni governments under Ali Abdullah Saleh and Abdrabou Mansour Hadi were
being challenged since 2004 by the Zaidi Shitte group, the Houthis, in the north. The challenge
was not that the Houthis had a strong military power with which they were able to confront the
government’s soldiers and even take over the major Yemeni port city, Al-Hudaydah, and the
capital, Sanaa, in 2014, but they were also providing the services that the government should
have been providing to the Yemenis such as security and other social services. Nasser AlSakkaf, a reporter from the Yemen Times reported when the Houthis controlled Sanaa in 2014
that “Security personnel manning checkpoints around the capital have disappeared and been
replaced by armed members from the Houthis, who call themselves ‘Ansar Allah,’ or
‘Supporters of God.’... While there remains a notable presence of rebels dressed in traditional
garb” (The Middle East Policy Council).
The south was not quite like the north, however, it was much more peaceful, as Southern
Yemenis or the Southern Movement (Hirak) have been calling for their independence and they
were not satisfied by the fact that Saleh’s and Hadi’s governments were giving much attention
to the Houthi threat and ignored their demands. Nadia Al-Sakkaf, another reporter from Yemen
said that “The news from the south is very disturbing. Already we are going through a
ridiculous takeover by the Houthis in the north and it was yet another disappointment to have
the Southern Movement, also known as Hirak, rise again with secessionist demands” (Ibid).
While Northern and Southern Yemen were already in a situation of disarray and
instability, the ghost of terrorism appeared to augment the Yemeni crisis with the growing
threat of Al-Qaeda in the south. Al-Qaeda seemed to be a challenge to the Houthis because AlQaeda militants were attacking cities very close to those that were captured by the Houthis
such as Ibb and Baida. Moreover, according to an editor from the Gulf Today Newspaper, the
“steady expansion of Huthis has increased the threat of an open confrontation with Qaeda”
(Ibid). These challenges made the Yemeni central government unable to extend its control over
the whole Yemeni cities and towns, as it is always three inflaming fronts that the government
has to fight in order to secure the whole existence of the Republic itself.
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2) The inability to provide basic services
It is often mentioned that Yemen is considered one of the poorest states in the Arab world.
The UN Human Development Report ranked it in 2019 as “extremely poor” with a rank of 177
out of 189 (Cordesman, 2020). Yemen’s per capita GDP was $824 in 2018 which is slightly
higher than Afghanistan’s (World Bank, 2018). Statistics show that poverty in Yemen
increased from 42% of the population in 2009 to 54.5% in 2012 (Cordesman, 2020). Also,
there is at least 8.4 million people at risk of starvation and 22.2 million people who constitute
around 75% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance (Bandyopadhay; Nag, 2020).
Additionally, 45% of the population lives on less than $2 per day, while unemployment
revolves around 35-40%, and child malnutrition rates are among the highest in the world (Ibid),
as 400,000 children under the age of five are facing severe acute malnutrition (Ibid). Moreover,
freshwater in Yemen is less than 200 cubic meters per capita per year, which is five times below
the water-poverty line and 3% of the global average (Ibid).
3) The need for international intervention
The Houthis’ take over of the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, on September 21, 2014, was a
watershed in the poor country’s history, as it gave a justification for foreign powers to intervene
and pursue their own interests in the Yemeni territories. Saudi Arabia formed a military
coalition claiming that its main objective would be securing the legitimate authority of Hadi’s
government against the Houthis’ threat.
However, it is considered an intervention “by invitation” because the Saudis didn’t act
without a request from the Yemeni president himself, as the GCC received a letter from Hadi
on March 7, 2015, to hold a conference in Riyadh to discuss the Houthi coup, then he sent
another letter before the conference saying that “.. I appeal to you my brothers and your sisterly
nations to stand — as you have accustomed us always — by the Yemeni people for the
protection of Yemen, and I ask you … to provide instant support by all necessary means,
including military intervention to protect Yemen and its people from continuous Houthi
aggression” (The National, 2015).
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c. Actors: The Multiple Yemen Actors
Yemen turned into an open battlefield for multiple actors with different agendas after the
fall of Saleh’s regime in 2011. However, there are three major actors who had and maybe still
have a great influence on the future of Yemen, they are; Abdrabou Mansor Hadi’s government,
the Houthis, the Southern Movement (Hirak), and the AQAP (Al-Qaeda), in the following I
am shedding the light on each one of them briefly.
1) Hadi’s Government
It was considered the legitimate internationally recognized government of Yemen after
former President Ali Abdullah Saleh was ousted in February 2012. Abdrabou Mansour Hadi
was the head of that government until the time of writing this thesis, he served as Saleh’s deputy
before being elected as the Yemeni president in February 2012. Hadi’s government emerged
from the GCC Framework that was formulated to smooth the power transition after Saleh’s
ousting.
Hadi’s government formed the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) on March 18, 2013,
which included fairly distributed representatives from all of Yemen for the sake of drawing the
political roadmap of the country in a consensual way. However, the NDC’s efforts to manage
the transitional period of the country faded away, and the NDC’s subcommittees submitted
1,800 recommendations would push the country towards a successful transition, but almost
none of these recommendations were actually achieved until 2020 due to security issues and
other political concerns (Sami, 2019: 42).
2) The Houthis
They are a Zaidi Shi’a group, they called themselves after the name of their godfather,
Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. They are a transformed version of the Believing Youth Forum
(BYF) that was established in 1992, and they started as a peaceful theological movement to
revive the Zaidism shrine by providing educational services for Yemeni youth (Nagi, 2019).
until the Yemeni former President, Saleh allowed the establishment of Sunni shrines in
northern Yemen, so they started to arm themselves and stand against Saleh’s attempts to
enhance the stance of Sunnis in the country, then they went through 6 “wars” from 2004 until
2010 (Sami, 2019: 44).
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Thereafter, the Houthis played a major role in the Yemeni uprisings in 2011 to oust Saleh,
then they were enthusiastic to join Hadi’s NDC to be an integral part of the country’s political
future. However, the clashes between the Houthis and the Sunni militias loyal to Saleh and the
assassination of two Houthi representatives in the NDC made the Houthis take a step back from
continuing in the political negotiations (Sami, 2019: 44). Once the NDC finalized its task and
submitted a recommendation to divide Yemen into 6 governorates which would make the
Houthis’ reach to the natural resources limited (Ibid), they resorted again to violence and
attacked Hadi’s forces, then they allied with the Saleh and his loyal militias to counter the
Saudi-led coalition which helped them to gain control of the capital, Sana’a, and keep the
division of the country farfetched. The Houthis then formed the Supreme Political Council
(SPC) to manage the cities and towns that fall under their control (Ibid: 45).
3) The Southern Movement (Hirak)
It is a political movement that was formed in the south in 2007. The main aim of that
movement is to make southern Yemen autonomous, so the movement stood against Saleh and
asked for a fair distribution of the resources and a “readjustment” to the balance of power
between the north and the south (Ibid: 45). Afterward, Hirak started to pursue its agenda within
the Southern Transitional Council (STC) that was formed in 2017, and they kept calling for
maintaining stability in the south, especially in the Gulf of Aden and Bab Al-Mandab (Ibid).
Furthermore, Hirak used to be a “hub” for discontented workers prior to the unification of
Yemen, then it turned into a strong opponent to the north. Moreover, the movement earns its
credibility as its most distinguished figures, such as Abd Al-Rahman Ali Al-Jifi and Ali Salem
Al-Beidh who were charismatic figures, and all of the southerners trusted to speak on their
behalf.
4) Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
In 2009, Al-Qaeda militants in Saudi Arabia and Yemen decided to unify under the name
of AQAP. Despite both militants were operating under the same terrorist umbrella which is AlQaeda, each one had different priorities, as those in Saudi Arabia focused on ending the
existence of foreign western troops in the Arabian Peninsula, while those in Yemen prioritized
domestic issues such as poverty, poor education, and corruption which helped them in
emotionally mobilizing some of the Yemeni population (Ibid: 46).
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It is believed that Yemen is fertile soil for terrorism because of its high poverty rates, bad
quality of education, high unemployment rates, and other socioeconomic factors that allowed
terrorist organizations such as the AQAP to easily mobilize young people in Yemen. However,
their glory moment was in 2011 when Saleh’s regime was busy resisting the regime change
demonstrations and he asked his Republican Guards to leave the southern governate of Abyan
to defend the capital Sana’a which created a security vacuum that the AQAP used to have a
foot in southern Yemen and they established Ansar Al-Sharia (AAS) to be a separate branch
of Al-Qaeda in Yemen with a full focus on gaining control in the country (Sami, 2019: 47).
The AQAP was marketing itself as the Yemeni people’s salvation and “promoter of
religious purity” and they were targeting the hearts and minds of the young Yemenis, as they
were providing some services to the people that Saleh’s regime couldn’t offer such as providing
electricity to forgotten areas, security services for the civilians, and even distributing charitable
goods for those that are in need (Ibid). Furthermore, the AQAP launched a war against the
Houthis because they were a huge bloc on their way towards reaching power and controlling
of the country. The AQAP markets for itself as the “guardian of the Sunnis” which helped them
in mobilizing radical Islamists to fight the Zaidis (Houthis) and also Hadi’s government (Ibid).
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Table (4): Overview of the Actors in Yemen (2011-2020)
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Source: Sami. M. (2019). ‘The Civil War in Yemen: Understanding the Actors’ in ‘Yemen in 2019: Causes,
Crisis and
Consequences’ Ed. Ben Lowings, Mohammed Sami and Elisa Cherry. Brussels International Center. Available at:
https://www.bic-rhr.com/research/yemen-policy-report-3-civil-war-yemen-understanding-actors
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Table (5): Foreign Actors in Yemen 2015-2020

12

d. Goals: Yemeni’s Sectarianism as Source for its Fragility
Yemen can be labeled as one of the most socially divided countries in the Arab world.
People in Yemen used to label each other based on race, language, and religion. They are
putting certain races on the top and others at the bottom, for instance mentioned that “A person
born to a Yemeni father and an African mother is not classified socially as a ‘Yemeni,’ even if
they possess Yemeni identification papers. Instead, they are called ‘muwalad’ which is a
derogatory label that indicates being hybrid, not pure-blooded” (Al-Thawr, 2021).

12

Source: Malmgren, V. (2021). ‘The Reconceptualized War: A critical analysis of the new war theory through a
case
study of the Yemen War’. Linköping University. P. 64. Available at: https://www.divaportal.org/smash/get/diva2:1576234/FULLTEXT01.pdf
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The unprecedented youth movement that forced the longtime ruler of the country, Saleh,
to hand over his role to his deputy, Hadi, made tribes and religious groups develop new
polarizing tools to mobilize those youth for their own political interests. The Yemeni society
has been mainly consisting of; 1) Top class is the Hashemites or Sayyids (Masters) who claim
their descent to the family of Prophet Muhammad. 2) Second class is the Ouda (judges) who
are mostly religious scholars, jurists, and state administrators. 3) Third class is the qabâ’îl,
(tribesmen) who consists the majority of the Yemeni society. 4) Fourth class is Bani Al-Khums
or Mazyaina (service providers), the artisans, butchers, and barbers, and they are a minority
due to the limited scope of their jobs. 5) The lower class consist of the ‘abîd (slaves), and the
Muhamesheen (marginalized), or Akhdam (servants) who have been subject to persecution,
isolation, and discrimination by the other classes (Ibid).
Using descent or religious origins as a tool to claim certain privileges is a deeply-rooted
method that is practiced by social classes in Yemen. By using that method, higher social classes
claim and introduce themselves as holy groups that have ‘divine’ privileges granted based on
‘sacred lineage’ (Ibid). For example, the Houthis replaced government and military officials
when they took over certain towns with Hashemite Zaidi people only because of their religious
origin and not for their expertise or skills (Ibid). Intermarriage is not possible among the top
Yemeni classes because each class or clan wants to maintain the “purity” of its origin, or what
is called “irq” which helps them to maintain their exclusive privileges, one of these privileges
is that Hashemites have the right to distribute one-fifth “Khums” of the country’s revenues
among people from their origin only. However, the Houthis during the latest conflict made
other clans hate the Hashemites and even attach those who would label themselves as
Hashemites (Ibid).
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Figure (12): Ethnicities in Yemen

Moreover, tribalism is evident in Yemen and has a great impact on the discourse of the
recent tensions in the country, as the country is considered one of the most “tribal” states in the
Middle East because 80% of the Yemeni belong to tribes (ACAPS, 2020: 2), and according to
“the Yemeni tribal system is a segmentary lineage society where certain structural principles
apply to groups and individuals” (Al-Thawr, 2021). Moreover, it is important to say that tribal
affiliation is crucial in identifying social capital and classes (Ibid).
Figure (13): Distribution of Tribes in Yemen
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Source: ACAPS (2020). ‘Tribes in Yemen: An introduction to the tribal system’. Available at:
https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200813_acaps_thematic_report_tribes_in_yemen_
0_0.pdf
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The Houthis mobilized their supporters in the name of “Zaidi revivalism” and the death
of their founder, Hussien Al-Houthi, augmented their grievances and kept his message alive
till today instead of dismantling the whole movement. Afterward, the movement found her
message not attracting many Yemenis as they wished, so they took the name of “Ansar Allah”
(Partisans of God) which is coming from a verse in the Quran to be more appealing to the
religious tribes. Moreover, they wanted to expand their outreach to the South, so they found
that followers of the Shafi’i school of Islamic law are dominating there, so they decided to
stress common principles such as unifying Muslims and countering corruption which urged
many Shafi’i followers to join the movement (Nagi, 2019).
Furthermore, the Houthis decided to form working groups across Yemen to help in
achieving their political and religious objectives. Each working group was led by 3 people who
were mainly responsible for monitoring the public institutions and deepening the Houthi
ideology in the society. Additionally, the Houthis exported an image to the west that they are
mainly fighting against the Salafi jihadism and extremism which was mainly represented by
the AQAP in the south, this image helped them to recruit more young passionate Zaidis and
gave the west an impression that they could rely on them in countering terrorism in the region
(Ibid), that was evident when the United States agreed to deal with the Houthis during the
transitional period until 2015, despite the fact that the Houthis are putting “Death to America”
as part of their slogan (Ibid).
Eliminating the Salafis was not enough for the Houthis to be the dominant actor in the
field, they decided to attack the Hashid tribes as well who were affiliated with Islah Party that
was adopting the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology (Ibid). The weakness of the Yemeni
government then led by the Prime Minister, Mohammed Salem Basindawa, allowed the
Houthis to gain momentum in the Yemeni conflict and turned the movement into a
revolutionary movement that is taking reform as their main objective and fighting against
corruption and inefficient governmental institutions (Ibid).
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e. Finance: The Houthis looting Yemen’s wealth by the war economy methods
In Yemen, both state and non-state actors relied on illicit methods to fund their operations
during the ongoing conflict. Starting with the Houthis, they collected rents and fees from the
citizens of Sanaa and they managed to generate 407 billion Yemeni riyals ($1.6 billion) in 2018
(DeLozier, 2019). Also, they were imposing import taxes at Hodeida and Al-Salif ports, they
were even putting checkpoints like the one they had in Dhamar to capture any shipment that
didn’t pay them taxes (Ibid). Moreover, they managed to generate additional income by
imposing taxes on oil imported from Iran which was estimated by some reports to be “tens of
millions of dollars per month” (Ibid). They used to provide fake papers that the origin of the
imported oil is either the United Arab Emirates or Oman to avoid the UN maritime monitoring
restrictions (Ibid).
On the other side, Hadi’s government was reported to be using illegal ways to increase
and enhance its patronage networks through; 1) Inflating Military Payrolls. 2) Monopolizing
Fuel Imports. 3) Misusing State Funds. In order to have real evidence for such accusations,
some reports showed that Hadi’s government was transferring public money to its allies
illegally in different ways such as facilitating the smuggling of crude oil into Marib province
(Ibid).
A panel established by the UN to investigate reported that Hadi’s government facilitated
the monopoly of the Alessi Group, whose director, Ahmed al-Essi, was a close adviser to Hadi
over fuel imports in Aden (Ibid). The UN panel was also investigating 4 other accusations
against Hadi’s government including; potential corruption in the Yemeni armed forces over
food supplies and the implantation of an import mechanism that benefited some senior officials
close to Hadi (Ibid).
f. The international intervention in Yemen
Yemen has always been an attractive prize that all foreign powers want to get to control
one of the crucial parts of the Gulf region. Foreign powers have been interfering in the Yemeni
affairs for a long time even before its unification. However, the fall of Saleh’s regime in 2011
made it fertile soil for proxy conflicts, especially between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both are
looking for an opportunity to flex their control over the region. Saudi Arabia was the most
visible international actor in the current conflict, as it all started with the Saudis convincing
Saleh to leave the power to his deputy to save the country from unprecedented instability.
Therefore, the Saudis have been putting the rules for the game since it actually started.
108 | P a g e

Iran was not far from the game as well, Iranians were looking for a weak link to have a
foot on the ground, they found their wish with the Houthis, who share a common religious
origin with them and hate their enemy, the Saudis. Hence, they took the Houthis’ side but in a
less visible way than the Saudis by funding and smuggling arms to the Houthis indirectly.
The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, the US, and Kuwait are also part of the Yemeni story,
almost all of them except Oman and Kuwait are afraid of an indefinite proxy conflict with Iran
and they are all playing both roles, the attacker and the negotiator. On the other side, Oman
and Kuwait were depicting themselves as welcoming neutrals who are always ready to host
peace talks among the competitors and they are willing to offer the needed help to the
conflicting parties to reach a compromise. It is important to mention that the US has been
actively involved in Yemen before the formation of the Saudi-led coalition because the
Americans were afraid of the rise of the AQAP and Hezbollah in the region and they found
that the security vacuum in Yemen is a golden door for those groups to grow and gain more
control.
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IV. IV Conclusion
Yemen is the poorest Arab state that has been ravaged by ethnic and tribal divisions and
conflicts. From conflicts between Sunnis, Salafis, and Shi’a to a conflict between pro-and antidemocracy. Internal conflicts have always been motivated by external actors who have certain
agendas to pursue in such as strategic countries. Controlling Bab al-Mandab Strait and being
the closest borders to the Gulf states’ all-time rival, Iran, have made Yemen a strategic focus
for regional leaders such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Table (6): New Wars Features in Yemen from 2011 till 2020

New Wars Features in Yemen from 2011-2020
Intra-State Conflict

√

Failed State

√

Multiple Active State and Non-State

√

Actors
Identity-Based Conflict

√

Population Displacement

-

War Economy Incentives

√

International Intervention

√

Applying Kaldor’s new wars features on Yemen has been an eye-opening exercise since
there were different parts of the puzzle shattered and when gathered together, the picture
became clearer. The ongoing conflict in Yemen is an intra-state war with multiple non-state
actors fighting the current legal state, and with sectarianism being the fuel that feeds the already
divided society, along with more profits can be earned from such a security vacuum through
illegal methods and nepotism. Finally, the door has been widely opened for foreign actors to
turn the poor divided country into an open battlefield for major regional powers such as Iran
and Saudi Arabia to add this strategic part to their sphere of influence and gain more regional
power. Thus, Yemen according to Kaldor can be considered as a clear new war case where
almost all features are easily tangible and clear to observe.
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General Conclusion: The Relevance of the Theory Today
In the 21st century, many life aspects have changed as waves of globalization have been
hitting all shores across the world and even reaching landlocked places. Technology
advancements were the immediate consequence of these waves, they made everything handy
and easy to reach with little or no effort to be exerted. The academic and research field received
such dramatic global changes with a revolution in ideas, critiques, and reviews for everything,
one of the areas that witnessed a theoretical revolution was the security field which includes
researches on conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Mary Kaldor represents one of the
revolutionary thinkers who led that academic change with her new wars’ theory.
Are there any “New” wars?
As a starting point to understand the nature, importance, and the relevance of Kaldor’s
theory is to mention the most controversial term on which most of the academic debate that
followed her publication focused on, which is whether there are really “new” wars in the postCold War era, or Kaldor’s misled her readers about an already existing theory. The point here
is that Kaldor herself clearly stated that she didn’t refer to a whole “new” type of wars, instead
she presented a new “logic” or “perspective” through which scholars and policymakers can
better understand conflicts in the post-Cold War era and put more efficient and comprehensive
policies to uproot the roots of such conflicts and reach compromises.
Another controversial point is that most of the critiques equate new wars with civil wars,
and this is a tricky confusion, as in essence, new wars according to Kaldor are intrastate wars
that occur within the same territories of the state, which is the same in civil wars and most of
the features of new wars can be applied on civil wars as well. However, Kaldor shows that
waves of globalization have been blurring the lines that distinguish soldiers from civilians,
public properties from private ones, and domestic and international factors, and it became a
difficult task to redraw these lines when all features of new wars collide.
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Are ‘new’ wars in essence ‘civil wars’?
It wouldn’t be an exaggeration to say that the distinction between Kaldor’s ‘new wars’
and civil wars is an infinite dilemma, as the line that differentiates between them is extremely
thin. Notwithstanding, as we have seen the response to the critiques of Kaldor’s framework in
Chapter II, I can say that what gives Kaldor a positive point here is her integration of
globalization in the framework. Globalization diminished all the traditional theoretical and
even material borders. When we look at any ongoing intrastate conflict today, we cannot be
sure who is combatant and who is civilian, what is public and what is private ownership, and
how non-state actors transfer and receive their money. The emergence of a globalized world
offers a different perspective about modern intrastate wars that are different than the world
during prominent civil wars such as the Spanish and Greek civil wars. Therefore, I can say that
the new wars theoretical framework is an advanced version of the civil wars’ framework. So,
any new war can be a civil war, but the opposite is not always correct.
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the theory?
In the following table, I am summarizing the strength and weakness points of the new
wars’ theory based on the critical assessment of my thesis;
Table (7): New Wars Theory Strengths and Weaknesses

Weaknesses
Incomplete
concepts.

definitions

for

Strengths
terms

and New holistic theoretical framework to study
intrastate conflicts.

Inaccurate generalization for the features of A guide for policymakers for mediation and
the theory.

peacebuilding.

Lack of empirical examples and theory Better understanding for the strategies and
testing.
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tactics of nonstate actors.

Did the empirical testing of Libya and Yemen support or refuted the theory?
I have applied the key features of new wars to real post-Arab Spring cases; Libya and
Yemen from 2011 to 2020, as this is the period when the traditional theories on civil wars were
being empirically tested. When we take Clausewitz’s concept of “wars” and its characteristics
and apply them to these cases, we can immediately notice that it is not fitting, as there are a lot
of changes in the mode of warfare that took place in both cases that need a new theory or
framework to analyze the roots and the reasons for the continuity of such complicated conflicts.
Features of new wars are mainly lying under the following classification;
6) Nature of the War, as interstate wars where sovereign states fight each other
is now replaced by a huge number of intrastate was where the organized state
armies are fighting non-state actors and networks of militias and mercenaries
(private security officers).
7) State fragility/Weak states, it is a commonly considered the most obvious
negative consequence of globalization because weak states couldn’t withstand
the openness that was brought with globalization, they found themselves unable
to control their territories, or provide public basic goods to their citizens which
made them easy prey for new wars and vicious open conflicts.
8) Actors, since there is a complex network of actors with different motivations
and agendas are involved in these conflicts instead of the normal state armies
only.
9) Motivation, and this is why new wars cannot be ever equated with old wars, as
new wars are being fought on an ethnic basis instead of ideological motivations
as in the Cold War era, it could be tribal, religious, or racial divisions.
10) Methods of finance (war economy), and this is what exacerbates the
complexity of these conflicts because actors in new wars are depending on illicit
ways to fund their operations, it could be smuggling, plundering, or illegally
trading resources. Even humanitarian aid can be abused and used to fund terror
and intimidation.
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11) International Intervention, this is a normal consequence of state fragility since
the state army cannot stop the increase of the armed non-state actors who are
seeking control of the political leadership, so governments appeal to the
international community to stand to protect lives and restore legitimacy and
stability.
12) Targeting civilians, and this is a widely observed feature of new wars, as there
are figures that show the huge increase in the ratio of civilian casualties in the
current conflicts and the clear intention of non-state actors to target the civilians
to complicate the situation which would prolong the fight and increase their
material profits.
All of these features were present in Libya and Yemen, except for counting civilian
casualties in conflicts, which was difficult an in most cases outdated and inaccurate. Hence,
the application of the features on the two cases proved to be relevant and helpful to better
understand the situation even when not on the ground, but the holistic view that the features of
the theory gave us can help policymakers to target the key factors that keep the tensions going
in both countries and try to reach a compromise or a new approach for peace.
How relevant is the New Wars theory today?
Generally speaking, Kaldor’s theory is very relevant to the growth of security and conflict
analysis, and peacebuilding. She offered a new theoretical framework through which scholars
can reach new and better policies and analyses for the ongoing and recent conflicts. The
ordinary focus on the state as the primary actor in all wars is now changed with the emergence
of non-state actors. It was mentioned by Brian Smith that there is a debate around “risk transfer
wars” where states resort to private security companies and mercenaries to fight on their side
against the militias and the other violent non-state actors on the battlefield in order to “minimize
the life risks to the military” (Smith, 2018: 94) and this was evident in cases like Yemen and
Libya.
Kaldor’s “new” framework helped in shifting scholars and policymakers’ focus from
identifying states’ national security areas, to new issues such as; poverty, non-state actors,
resource wars, migration, identity segmentation, humanitarian aids abuses, and the emerging
role of civil society organizations (NGOs). This has urged researchers to revisit and redefine
related concepts and put new policy perspectives that are enriching the quest for better conflict
resolution and peacebuilding policies.
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The new wars’ theory provided a “new” policy approach that would allow policymakers
to formulate more efficient, comprehensive, specifically tailored, and timely policies to halt the
tragedy of the ongoing open conflicts in places like the Middle East and Africa. Furthermore,
Kaldor has shed the light on the post-conflict state-building and the protection of civilians. The
integration of all actors in these policy-setting phases is crucial and an added value from the
new wars thesis, since old traditional approaches were touching the conflicts from the surface,
while Kaldor urges policymakers and thinkers to dig deeper and bring their sketches and draw
the big picture of the conflict to understand its roots and the ways to uproot them.
Moreover, tracing the funding networks of the actors involved in the conflicts is an
important way to curb their operations and force them to set at the negotiation table, which was
an important feature of Kaldor’s new framework. Eventually, we can say that Kaldor’s thesis
is still relevant to our world today, scholars and decision-makers can use it to set potential
successful policies instead of the outdated inefficient current ones for complex conflicts like
the Libyan and the Yemeni conflicts, but the theory needs more empirical testing,
comprehensive definitions, and analytical discussions on further development for the theory.
What if we accepted the new wars framework to deal with ongoing intrastate conflicts?
Using Kaldor’s new wars theoretical framework should lead us to something new, a
breakthrough in the analysis, and thus in the peacebuilding process in such conflicts. For
Kaldor, she believes that there should be a form of “cosmopolitan political mobilization” that
is built on the strategy of capturing ‘hearts and minds’ instead of the strategy of sowing ‘fear
and hate’, inclusiveness that is counterposed against the politics of exclusion, a respect for
international principles and legal norms to counter the criminality of the warlords.
Any peace plan for an intrastate conflict today should start by forming a non-biased
independent group chosen by international organizations to talk to all parties involved in the
conflict, especially the non-state actors, then in a parallel path, a group of international
investigators should track and cut the source of funding, or the methods of war economy, that
warlords are relying on in their fights to force them to sit on the negotiations table and reach a
compromise. The last step would be rebuilding and strengthening the state through capacity
building and different types of institutional cooperation to regain the state legitimate monopoly
of violence. Therefore, a good peace policy should empower the locals, or major tribes in the
targeted state and give them all the means to gather all parties of the conflict away from the
rigid international peacebuilding approaches.
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